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This thesis attempts to explicate the manifestation of 
suicidal behavior in latency age children based on 
developmental object relations theory. It asserts that the 
susceptibility to suicidal behavior becomes part of the 
child's developing ego organization during the first three 
years of 1 i fe as the result of deviant or distorted 
2 
emotion al development. These disturbances interfere with 
the normal internalizing processes of the separation-
i ndividuation phases, including the development of 
psychological mechanisms. 
To accomplish the purpose of the study, the thesis 
generally classifies object relations theory within the 
parameters of developmental psychopathology and specifically 
classifies it as a component of contemporary psychodynamic 
theory. Then follows an exposition of the separation-
individuation process and attendant development of 
psychological mechanisms in normal and disturbed 
development. This section concludes by identifying the 
normally developing child ar6und thirty-six months of age as 
possessing the capacity to unite disparate self and object 
images into a single, whole person for appropriate self-
comfort, self-image formation, and self-esteem regulation 
through having received primarily gratifying interactions 
with caregivers. The child with disturbed development lacks 
this capacity because of th~ ~nternalization of primarily 
negative object-images through primarily negative 
interactions with caregivers. The child lacks trust in 
itself and in others, tends to perceive itself and others as 
all-good or all-bad, and experiences hostility and 
depression. 
A definition of latency and a description of this 
developmental stage follows. Cognitive development marked 
3 
by secondary thought processes and reliance upon dynamic 
psychological mechanisms--ego defenses--to sustain a 
behavioral and emotional equilibrium, rather than a 
diminution of drives, permit latency to become established. 
As part of the structure of latency, fantasy serves a 
defensive and adaptive function by providing an outlet for 
drive expression and for mastery of situations 
intrapsychically. Children with disturbances in ego 
organization have a less established structure of latency 
than do normal children, that is, they rely to a greater 
extent on psychological mechanisms characteristic of the 
separation-individuation phases. 
A review of empirical and clinical research of 
suicidal children encompasses family environment; loss, 
depression, and hopelessness; cognitive functioning; and 
defense mechanisms. Suicidal children live in stressful, 
chaotic families with confused role relationships. Findings 
regarding the relationships among loss, depression, and 
hopelessness appear mixed although integrally related. 
Suicidal children conceive of impersonal death as final 
while construing personal death as reversible as a defensive 
maneuver. Suicidal fantasies constitute the precursors to 
suicidal planning and actions. Suicidal children show 
impaired ability to devise active coping strategies. They 
seem to rely excessively on ego defenses considered 
4 
developmentally appropriate in early stages of development, 
such as introjection. 
A synthesis of theoretical formulations and research 
findings sets forth the developmental sequence culminating 
in suicidal behavior. The model depicts a child's 
developing ego organization predisposed to depression, 
hostility, and low self-esteem caused by the internalization 
of a predominance of negative self- and object-images. It 
portrays susceptibility to suicidal behavior through the 
incapacity to exercise self-protection under stressful 
situations because of a reliance upon maladaptive ego 
defenses. Fantasies to relieve psychic pain as part of 
latency defenses transform into fantasies of suicide; these 
presage and allow for planning and, given the failure of ego 
defenses, suicidal behavior results. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Compared with the 50,000 to 500,000 suicide attempts 
and approximately 5,000 deaths per year in the 15 to 24 age 
range <Allen, 1987>, or 12 per 100,000 <Pfeffer, 1986>, the 
200 suicides for 5 to 14 year-olds in 1982, or 0.6 per 
100,000 <Pfeffer, 1986) appear low and have remained 
constant over the past 40 years <Shaffer & Fisher, 1981a). 
For children aged 6 to 12 referred to psychiatric clinics, 
however, suicidal behavior--"any self-destructive behavior 
that has an intent to seriously damage oneself or cause 
death" <Pfeffer, 1986, p. 
one-third of them <Hawton, 
14>--has occurred in one-tenth to 
1982). Although suicide seldom 
occurs in children under 11 <Kienhorst, Wolters, Diekstra, & 
Ottie, 1987>, authorities agree "that the statistics 
severely mask the reality ••• <and that> ••• parents and 
physicians conceal many cases of childhood and adolescent 
suicide, or report them as accidents" 01c6ui re & Ely, 1984, 
p. 19). An undetermined, but "large proportion of childhood 
lethal accidents" are unrecognized or unreported suicides 
<Adams & Fras, 1988, p. 543). 
Using rates of suicide as the basis for comparison, 
"childhood affords a degree of protection that has been 
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unaffected by the considerable changes in social environment 
experienced over the past century" <Shaffer ~ Fisher, 1981a, 
P. 550>. Children who do attempt suicide CKienhorst et al., 
1987> experience environments characterized by problems. 
11 However, we st i 11 do not know why most of the chi 1 dren 
living in such a situation Cor a more difficult one> do not 
make a suicide attempt and the remainder do" Cp. 165). 
Shaffer and Fisher C1981b) claim that 
what needs to be explained is not some factor which 
predisposes children to suicidal behavior but rather 
the reverse. Given that beliefs in the 
reversibility of death are common and that suicide 
is uncommon in childhood it cannot follow that one 
finding explains the other Cp. 97). 
Addressing these questions within the parameters of 
this study, this thesis asserts that children resort to 
suicide because their protective psychological mechanisms--
ego defenses--fail them during periods of chronic stress or 
intense stress. This thesis is not a new one; it was stated 
by Schechter in 1957: "It is when the degree of tension is 
extremely high and the defense mechanisms break down or 
become ineffective that suicide or suicidal equivalents may 
appear" Cp. 132). 
The intention of this project is to explain how 
manifest suicidal behavior occurs using the approach of 
psychoanalytic developmental object relations theory. This 
thesis thus addresses aspects of ego-defensive functioning--
that which protects from self-destructive actions and that 
which permits self-destructive actions. 
Through an examination of suicidal behavior in 
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latency-age children from a psychoanalytic developmental 
object-relations approach, this thesis contends that the 
susceptibility to suicidal behavior becomes part of the 
child's ego organization during the first three years of 
development. The precipitating environmental events to 
suicidal behavior, inordinate stress and loss, confront an 
ego-organization which lacks the capacity adequately to 
protect the child fro• self-destructive actions. Suicidal 
behavior is thus construed as a consequence of a process of 
disturbed development rather than as a discrete, impulsive 
act brought about by a sudden, massive regression in ego 
functioning. 
The term development includes both normal and 
psychopathological development and refers to psychological 
changes and functioning which attend physical maturation. 
Within this conceptualization of development, "the ego is to 
be regarded as the process of organization per se. • • • the 
ego is defined by its functioning" <Blanck 8' Blanck, 1979, 
PP• 8-9>. That is, 
the ego is seen primarily as enabling the regulation 
and adaptation of the personality to external 
reality •••• has a range of functions, including 
observation, reality testing, rational thought and 
perception •••• functions largely within the 
conscious domain except for its defence mechanisms 
which are unconscious processes <Walrond-Skinner, 
1986, pp. 108, 110). 
Psychopathological development refers to modifications 
of the ego. Deviant development describes aspects that 
"depart too early frota the normal"; distorted development 
describes the "internalization of faulty perceptions of self 
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and object representations" <Blanck & Blanck, 1974, p. 93). 
As an example, Aber and Allen (1987> comment: 
One general interpretation of the effects of 
maltreatment is that it slows children's rate of 
socioemotional development. An alternative position 
is that maltreatment does not lead to developmental 
lags but rather to qualitative differences in 
development. Recent research suggests that these 
two positions may not be mutually exclusive but, 
rather, may work in complex, sequential fashion •••• 
For some populations of children at risk, initial 
developmental lags may become structuralized over 
time into nondevelopmental, qualitative differences 
in developmental pathways Cp. 412). 
This thesis thus contends that deviations or 
distortions in emotional development predispose some 
children to suicidal behavior, and further, that the primary 
and critical areas of development are the functions of 
object relations and the psychological mechanisms of ego 
defenses. These children's self-protective mechanisms are 
unstable and unreliable. Alternatively, relatively 
successful completion of the tasks of the first three years 
results in a latency-age child with an ego organization 
capable of mastering the developmental tasks of this age, 
including the capacity for self-protection. 
In response, then, to the question why more latency-
age children do not kill themselves, the thesis proposes 
that the "structure of latency" CSarnof f, 1987) affords a 
degree of protection for children who have successfully 
completed the tasks of emotional developaent. The 
"structure of latency," a categorical term which describes 
the ego-organization of the child between the approximate 
ages six through twelve, may also fail to protect the child 
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whose early emotional development includes deviations or 
distortions. That is, the child's protective psychological 
mechanisms are tentative or fluid, and protection through 
ego regression is insufficient. The child loses the 
protective and relative safety of latency, and suicidal 
behavior ensues. 
Although an ini•ical environment by itself provides an 
inadequate explanation for suicidal behavior, a description 
of environmental phenomena is necessary to account for 
external stresses which contribute to it. Living in a 
family means developing within a family's system, and 
particular systems foster deviations or distortions in 
development as the child adapts to them. 
The organization of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 
11 includes a classification and definition of 
psychoanalytic developmental object relations theory, 
including criticisms, followed by a description of the 
separation-individuation process and phase-appropriate 
reliance on particular psychological mechanisms. Chapter 
III elucidate5 the 5tructure of latency, including reaction5 
to loss and conceptions of depression. Chapter IV reviews 
the literature on childhood suicide and interprets findings 
in order to articulate a theoretically sound 
conceptualization of suicidal behavior in latency-age 
children. Chapter V presents the conceptualization in the 
form of a model. 
CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENTAL OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY 
Two approaches direct this thesis.. Developmental 
psychopathology sets forth the general framework and 
psychoanalytic developmental object relations theory 
determines the conceptual presentation. 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
The principles of developmental psychopathology are 
stated in the following propositions set forth by Sroufe and 
Rutter (1984) in "The Do•ain of Develop•ental 
. Psychopathology": 1. Holisnu Understanding the meaning of 
behavior requires consideration of its entire psychological 
contextf 2. Diractedness-1 Over time one takes a greater 
role in constructing the environmentf 3. Differentiation of 
•odes and goals1 Over time one becomes aore· flexible and 
organized; 4. Mobility of behavioral functions1 Behavior 
•anifested early in develop.ant i• integrated into behavior 
mani fasted later in development, 5. Probleas of continui.ty 
and change: Human develop•ent proceeds along •· lawful 
course, and a connection exists between "early adaptation 
and later disorder" Cpp. 20-22>. Deviations fro• the nor•al 
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course of develop•ent define disordered behavior <Sroufe & 
Rutter, 1984, p. 19> or "deviations that lead to 
pathological develop.ent" <Blanck & Blanck, 1974, p. 71>. 
An essential principle of develop•ental 
psychopathology ·is called the "orthogenetic principle" 
<Cicchetti le Schneider-Rosen, 1984>. It·· asserts that 
"development proceeds fro• global and diffuse states, by 
means of differentiation and integration, to states of 
art i cul at ion and hi er arc hi cal complexity" Cp. 11). Two 
others are stated by Garber <1988)1 "Develop•ent is a 
series of behavioral reorganizations around specific salient 
develop•ental issues •••• Develop.ental issues are broadly 
integrative and cut across affective, social, and cognitive 
domains" Cp. 32>. 
The successfully functioning child is a competent one, 
one who uses "environmental and personal resources to attain 
a satisfactory, age-appropriate adaptation ••• Cby 
successfully resolving> ••• the develop•ental tasks salient 
to his or her age" <Cicchetti It Schneider-Rosen, 1984, p. 
8). Conversely, .aladapta.tion . <Garber, 1988> is defined in 
ter•s of inco•petence or deviation in the C09Pl•tion of 
developmentally-defined tasks or in ter•s of failure to dtNl 
with phase-appropriate experiences. 
DEVELOPMENTAL OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY 
In "Developmental Psychopathology: A Nine-Cell Map of 
8 
the Territory," illustrated in Figure 1, Cowan <1988) 
categorizes developmental object relations theory into two 
of nine cells, the "Individual Psychological Level of 
Analysis Internal Views: Cell 4 11 <p. 13) and the 
"Relationship Level of Analysis •••• Internal Views: Cel 1 7 11 
(p. 18). 
Internal External Interactive 
Physical/Biological Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 
Individual/Psychological Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6 
Relationship Cell 7 Cell 8 Cell 9 
Figure 1. Nine explanations of stability and change. 
Adapted from Cowan <1988). 
In cell 4, Cowan places humanistic psychology with its 
emphasis on "innate inner forces pushing individuals toward 
self-actualization" with psychoanalytic psychology with its 
emphasis on "stage changes in the locus of pleasure 
driven by underlying biological development" (p. 13>. 
Adequate parenting ensures "development toward increased 
levels of adaptation" <p. 13). 
Cowan criticizes this cell because he holds that 
"external forces do interfere with the child's development," 
and these theories consider events as "distal causes of 
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psychopathology, setting in motion a chain of events 
resulting in an internal proximal cause of stability and 
change" Cp. 13>. That is, the child reacts to disruptions 
with anxiety, which in turn "mobilize defenses, and 
unbalance the relative influences of id, ego, and superego 
on behavior 11 Cp. 13). 
Regarding cell 7, Cowan includes the terms working 
models and relationship sche.aes along with object relations 
to denote the beginning development of symbolic 
relationships within the child during its first year. 
Object relations theorists emphasize the 11 earliest bond or 
attachment between caretaker and child as laying the 
essential foundation for later child develop•ent and 
adaptation" <pp. 18-19>. He notes the work of American 
researchers conducting inter-generational studies whose 
findings support "the hypothesis that the quality of early 
and continuing parent-child relationships may be important 
in the child's later progress through nor•al developmental 
stages or tasks• (p. 19). He also notes that studies 
exa•ining the relationship between disruptions in parent-
chi 1 d bonds and later anxiety, depression, and aggression 
"have not yet led to clear-cut results" <p. 19>. 
Criticis•s of the two cells coae from Cicchetti and 
Schneider-Rosen <1984). Proposing a transactional model of 
childhood psychopathology, they label the internally-focused 
models "early experience" and "main-effects" <p. 15> which 
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·they consider "too si•plistic for most of today's 
investigators" <p. 15). They claim the models are 
"deficient" because neither clinical observation nor 
empirical research affirms "a strict cause-effect 
deter•inis•,• because they disregard the person's active 
responses to nocuous causes, because :they f ai 1 to account 
for variations in time prior to the manifestation of 
symptoms, and because a stress on factors predisposing one 
to depression dee•phasizes later experiences which may 
militate against pathology or contribute to more serious 
pathology (pp. 15-16). 
Frotn a psychoanalytic position, Brody <1982) 
indirectly criticizes object relations theory by criticizing 
the land•ark study conducted by Mahler, Berg.ann, and Pine 
<1975). She contends that it lacks validi·ty because of 
defects in methodology, metaphoric or adultomorphic 
interpretations of behavior, and bias in findings. She 
considers that a child's sense of "autonomy, or 
independence, or individuation• could be assessed •ore 
accurately around age six than between ages three and four 
because of the develop•ental tasks occurring between three 
and six (p. 571-572>. 
Despite these criticis•sr conte•porary object 
relations theory possesses a similar rationale as the 
transactional model of childhood psychopathology. It see•s 
applicable to the "internal" views taken here <Cicchetti It 
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Schneider-Rosen. 1984): "A transactional tnodel views the 
1Rultiple transactions among environmental forces. caregiver 
characteristics. and child characteristics, as dyna•ic• 
reciprocal contributions to the events and outcomes of child 
develop.ent• Cp. 19>. 
The formulations of contemporary object relations 
theory derive fro• clinical observation and empirical 
research of infants and toddlers. Its utility is stated by 
Brody < 1982): 
It is during infancy that potentials may be observed 
for a balance of active and passive aims, qualities 
of object relations and of beginning 
·identifications, function pleasures, or for the lack 
of these. The staying power of these potentials 
builds habitual ways of responding to inner and 
outer events that underlie health or illness. They 
reflect nascent character qualities <p. 582). 
Fraiberg <1987> adds that "the period of greatest 
vulnerability with respect to later develop.ant is in the 
period under two years of lifeu Cp. 18>. Children deprived 
of "prolonged inti•acy with a nurturing person •••• show 
varying degrees of impairment in the capacity to attach 
themselves •••• seem to form their relationships on the basis 
of need and satisfaction of need" <pp. 18, 21>. Studies of 
deprived infants identify "disorders of impulse control. 
particularly in the area of aggression 11 <p. 19). She 
concludes that pathological fa•ilies fail . to provide 
significant attach•ents because a depressed or addicted or 
psychotic caretaker <mother> is an absent one Cp. 19>. 
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Description of the Theory 
A description of psychoanalytic developmental object 
relations theory, Cowan's cell 7, relationship levels of 
analysis, internal views, follows. 
Kernberg C19SO> defines object relations theory as 
an integral part of contemporary ego psychology •••• 
it represents a special approach or focus within the 
structural viewpoint that links structure •ore 
closely with developmental, genetic, and dyna•ic 
aspects of mental functioning. 
Blanck and Blanck (1986> present 
the ter• psychoanalytic develODMental ob iect 
relations theory. • • • • In psychoanalytic parlance 
an object is a person other than the subject. But 
psychological life does not begin with perception of 
self and other. Even when perception begins, self 
and object i•ages are merged. Conte•porary ego 
psychology describes the first three years of life 
as a dyadic experience during which the merged 
images separate out gradually into more or less 
distinct and stable self and object representations. 
This suggests that even the ter• object relations 
theory is somewhat of a •isnomer; it should be self 
and obiect relations theory. This would reflect the 
psychology of the early days, weeks, and months of 
1 i fe <pp. 1-2>. 
Hamilton <1988) explains: 
• An object is a person, place, thing, idea, fantasy, 
or memory invested with e•ot i onal energy <I ove or 
hate or •ore •odulated coabinations of love and 
hate>. An external object is a person, place, or 
thing invested with e.ational ener.gy. An internal 
object is an idea, fantasy, or metRC>ry pertaining to 
A person, place, or thing <p. 7>. 
The concept of self is more difficult CHa•ilton, 
1988)1 
The ability to see objects as different from one 
another precedes the ability to appreciate self as a 
separate entity.... Self refers to conscious and 
unconscious mental representations that pertain to 
one's own person •••• whereas object sometintes Means 
an external person, place, or thing and sometimes an 
internal image, self always refers to an internal 
image. According to this usage, someone viewed by 
an outside observer is not a self, but a person. 
The self is private <pp. 9, 12). 
Pine <1985) holds that 
what defines contemporary object relations theory is 
• • • a view of mental 1 i fe that is organized around 
self and object representations and their relations 
and repetitions in addition to an organization of 
mental life around drive, defense, and conflict <p. 
61). 
Object relations, then <Hamilton, 1988) are 
the interactions of the self and internal or 
external objects.... An object relations unit is a 
self-representation and an internal object connected 
by a drive or affect. When the distinction between 
self and object in an object relations unit is 
unclear, it is called a self-object. Symbiosis is 
the first and most thoroughly undifferentiated self-
.. object out of which other object relations evolve 
(pp. 13, 15, 20). 
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Object relations theory <Blanck & Blanck, 1986> "is far more 
than the simple action of the environment upon the child; it 
is infinitely more complex, involving action, reaction, and 
interaction" Cp. 15>. 
The "organizing principle" <Blanck ~ Blanck, 1979> of 
contemporary object relations theory considers that 
major aspects of intrapsychic and behavioral 1 i fe 
are organized around processes of separation and. 
individuation •••• ego structure per se evolves out 
of these processes as they encompass the impact of 
the instinctual drives. Differentiation of self 
images fro• object images is an essential part of 
the process of ego organization •••• the ego develops 
the function of object relations as ego structure 
derives si•ultaneously fro• object relations <p. 
21). 
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They add that "the self and object images, merged at first, 
separate out gradually as the infant sorts out that which is 
self from that which is other." Assisting this 
accomplishment is physical maturation and, initially, the 
force of the aggressive drive <Blanck & Blanck, 1986). 
The .other-infant dyad constitutes the environment out 
of •which "self and object images are built out of myriad 
daily affective experiences that begin on day one or before" 
<Blanck le Blanck, 1986, p. 50>. They consider a well-
matched mother-child pair one in which "a child who responds 
to a responsive mother. A less-responsive child fortunately 
matched with a mother who extends herself. A child who can 
reach out to a less responsive mother, forcing her to 
respond" C1986, pp. 51-52). A poorly matched pair includes 
"a child who gets little or no response even upon reaching 
out •••• <or> ••• a child unable to make a connection with the 
mothering person no matter how much she reaches out" Cp. 
52). 
Separation-individuation, whose pri•ary task consists 
in "the developM&nt of relatedness to a signi fie ant other, 
with the achievement and maintenance of self-other 
differentiation CPine, 1985, p. 46> proceeds in stages. 
The stages were distinguished by Mahler, Pine, and Bergman 
in their ten-year observational study of normal infants and 
children and their mothers and explicat.ed in The 
Psvchological Birth of the Human Infant (1975). 
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Normal autism. The first phase of the growth process, 
fr om birth to two months, is labeled normal autism. 
Ha•ilton (1988) describes it: "The infant forms a more or 
less closed psychological syste• and is cloaked in the 
reverie of a sleeplike state. The newborn's psychological 
withdrawal approximates the insulation of intrauterine life" 
Cp. 36). Based on results of infant research, Blanck and 
Blanck <1986) hold that "new evidence shows only that there 
is alertness and reception of input earlier than supposed" 
Cp. 55). The theoretical basis for their conclusion is that 
"nor•al infants possess apparatuses that are potentiated 
upon contact with the average expectable environment because 
the neonate is at the peak of adaptive capacity" <p. 55). 
Concurring, T. M. Horner (1988) holds that "the original 
psychic condition of life is one of sensory, perceptual, and 
cognitive distinctions" <p. 6). 
Pine believes the utility of the normal autism concept 
is its provision of a "contrast point for a later period 
when the infant's investment in the mothering one is clearly 
relatively more in evidence .. Cp. 48). 
Should early connection fail through the mother's or 
infant's shortco•ings, "innate apparatuses are not quickened 
at the age appropriate tiae. They renaain as unrealized 
potential and •ay not be quickened belatedly because, for 
sonae functions, ti•ing is of the essence" <Blanck ~ Blanck, 
1986, p. 55). 
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Normal symbiosis. In the normal symbiotic phase, from 
two to six months, the infant "begins to behave as if his 
•other and he were part of the sa.e '01Rnipotent' systeaa--a 
dual unity within one com•on boundary" <Hamilton, 1988, p. 
38). A "two-person relationship" does not yet exist, for 
differentiation is just beginning through early ego 
functions--"•e•ory, cognition, motor coordination"--which 
enable rudimentary organization and the initial sense of a 
self <p. 38). 
The child's "unfolding ego functions" are enhanced by 
a loving, responsive parent, for 11 if the child does not have 
such a relationship, if his mother does not adequately 
receive his cues about his needs and respond to them, the 
child's genetically programmed ego functions fail to 
develop• <Hamilton, 1988, p. 38>. As evidence of this 
assertion, Hamilton cites the studies conducted by Spitz 
(1965>, in which children who had lost their mothers and 
ended up in foundling homes lacked sufficient hu•an contact 
and interaction. Although they received enough food, some 
of them eventually died. 
Even within opti•al environ•ents, infants experience 
unpleasant sensations and events which distress thee 
<Hamilton, 1988, p. 39>. Developmentally, these experiences 
facilitate the early distinctions between self-i•ages and 
object-images in that "pleasure and pain, good and bad, 
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become a second polarity around which the chi Id organizes 
its world, along with the self-other polarity" <p. 40). 
The pleasure and pain polarity <Blanck ~ Blanck, 1979) 
beco.es associated with caretakers in the infant, that is, 
the gratifying, "good" parent provides pleasure, the "bad" 
parent permits the experience of distress, but the 
experiences remain separate. "Good" experiences of self and 
object images fRUst predominate over "bad" ones for normal 
affect development. Because the "phase-specific requirement 
is for union," a premature differentiation of separation 
served by aggression will interfere with the symbiotic union 
and its requirement for primarily "good" experiences Cpp. 
56-57). 
Separation-individuation~ The separation-
individuation phase, from 6 to 24 months, consists of three 
subphases. Entry into separation-individuation <Blanck & 
Blanck, 1979) provides "myriad opportunities for 
enhance111ent <or impairment) of sel f .-estee•.... The very 
experience of adequacy, that is, optimal fulfillment of the 
develop.antal purpose, adds to the sense of self-valuation" 
Cp. 59). Pine C 1985) • maintains that meeting the tasks of 
this stage is critical for cognitive developlM!flt·, for the 
infant's awareness "of separation is anchored in perceptual 
reality, which leads to an organization of stitM.tl i and of 
memories around the self-other distinction" <p. 247). 
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According to Blanck and Blanck <1986>, separation 
occurs through the stage-appropriate predominance of the 
aggressive drive and activity. int•rest in persons besides 
the mother. and the mother's letting go her own need for 
union with the infant. 
The first subphase, hatching, or differentiation, from 
6 to 10 months, is marked by the infant's appearance of 
alertness, purposeful actions, and "displays an increasing 
interest in the appearance of other people as opposed to his 
parent" CHa•ilton, 1988, p. 41>. Mahler <1986> considers 
the process "a gradual ontogenetic evolution of the 
sensoriu•--the perceptual-conscious system--which leads to 
the infant-toddler•s having a more permanently alert 
sensorium, whenever he is awake" <p. 224). Children who 
benefitted fro• an opti•al sy•biotic phase display 
confidence and curiosity in the differentiation subphase. 
Those who have not display distrust and excessive anxiety 
around strangers. 
In the practicing subphase, fro• ten to sixteen 
months, the infant "gradually emerges fro• differentiation" 
<Hamilton, 1988, p. 43>. The "early practising phase" 
<Mahler. 1986) is chartilcterized by the infant's earliest 
ability to move away physically from mother by crawling. 
climbing and righting himself, yet still holding on" <p. 
226). The child and mother develop a specific bond in which 
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the toddler re•ains close to the aother, who provides 
security, while exploring the environment. 
In the practicing subphase proper, the "thrust" to 
separate <Blanck le Blanck, 1986, p. 53) serves "the rapidly 
growing autonomous ego and its functions; the child seems 
intoxicated with his own faculties and with the greatness of 
his world• C"ahler, 1986, p. 228). l'lahler considers the 
chi 1 d's elation during this subphase partly the thri 11 of 
separation cOMbined with the reassurance of connection. 
In their study, Mahler and colleagues noted that the 
children beca•e low-keyed only as they became aware that 
their mothers were absent fr0tn the room. Children then 
displayed a decrease in motility and less interest in their 
surroundings; they .. appeared to be preoccupied once again 
with inwardly concentrated attention, with what Rubinfine 
<1961> called 'i•aging'" Cp. 229>. During these times, 
children responded with tears to atte•pts by the staff to 
comfort them, and required the mother's presence and reunion 
to return to their previous state. The children's behavior 
while separated fro• their mothers seemed like a "miniature 
anaclitic depression •••• the child's effort to hold on to a 
state of mind ••• the 'ideal state of self'" Cp. 229). 
Rapprochement, the third subphase in the separation-
indi viduati on process, takes place fre>tD about sixteen to 
twenty-five months. Mahler C1986) notes the toddler's 
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awareness and use of separateness along with increased 
concern for her availability in relation to the practicing 
sub phase. The child possesses "an increasingly clear 
differentiation between the intrapsychic representation of 
the object and the self-representation" which involves 
relinquishing the sense of grandiosity Cpp. 230-231). 
Rapprochement thus describes "a process of restoring 
positive equilibrium following perturbations" in the 
toddler-parent relationship, a process of effectively 
dealing with frustrating interactions and "re-attaining 
basic love and security" <T. M. Horner, 1988, p. 13). 
The child reacts to the loss of grandiosity with 
tantrums. These represent the hurt from "rejection by the 
old symbiotic partner" <Hamilton, 1988, p. 47) and "defense 
against the depressive realization" <Blanck & Blanck, 1979, 
p. 61) made possible by the attainment of a greater degree 
of reality testing <Blanck & Blanck, 1986). 
Mahler <1986> considers the rejection experienced 
by the child as "fear of loss of love" and that it takes 
place while the child yet fears the loss of the object (p. 
231). These fears produce wide enaotional swings in which 
the child treats the parent as "all-good or all-bad" 
depending on the child's mood <Hamilton, 1988, p. 48). 
A. J. Horner <1984) explains: 
~The rapproche11ent period marks the shift from 
nor•al, developmental splitting to the capacity for 
a•bivalence toward a single object, although the 
consolidation of this capacity does not come about 
until toward the end of the separation-individuation 
process <p. 139). 
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The main task of this subphase is a delicate one 
<Blanck ~ Blanck, 1979>, for the toddler must acquire more 
realistic expectations of the self and others. The child 
must possess a balance of self and object images in order to 
sustain independence and self-esteem while maintaining 
predominantly good feelings toward the parents. 
Adequate sel f-estee• is cal led "rapprochement 
adequacy" <Blanck 8c Blanck, 1979, p. 61>. Its acquisition 
follows the child's capacity to value itself by applying to 
the expanding self-image the admired qualities of the 
object-image through selective identification. 
The risk attending this subphase involves a loss of 
self-estee• and establishment of a "basic depressive affect 
through failure of maternal response" <Blanck 8c Blanck, 
1974, p. 72). This constitutes object loss and "leads to 
denigration of both self and object" <p. 72>. They provide 
an example: 
The mother died at a stage in the child's 
development when separation-individuation had not 
yet been completed, when object loss would feel like 
loss of part of oneself, when disappointment in the 
failure of the mother's omnipotence would result in 
disillusionment, aggression, and loss of self-
estee•, when separation anxiety would be severe, 
when the capacity to mourn and thereby overcome the 
loss was not yet available <pp. 272-273). 
Another danger involves difficulty modifying or 
limiting aggression because the child's love for its parent 
is unable to overcome the experiences of frustration when 
they predominate <Fraiberg, 1987>. 
22 
The disruption of the 
infant-parent attachment 11 can have permanent effects upon 
the later capacities of the child to love and to learn" <p. 
440-441). 
The fourth stage of separation-individuation, object 
constancy, takes place from 24 to 36 months and beyond. 
Object constancy <Hami 1 ton, 1988) "means the ability to hold 
a steady image of the object, especially the mother, whether 
she is present or absent, gratifying or depriving" (p. 53). 
It is "the capacity to recall good feelings about a parent 
while seriously disappointed in them" <p. 55). This 
capacity allows the toddler to comfort itself through the 
internal representation of the caretaker and reduces 
physical dependence on the caretaker's actual presence. 
This developmental gain serves the toddler's autonomy <Pine, 
1985). 
Recalling good feelings about the parent and using 
them for self-comfort permit another developmental gain, the 
capacity CPine, 1985) "to unite all aspects of the mother, 
the good and the bad, in one concept" Cp. 106). In normal 
development, this capacity is gradually achieved by age 
three. The child then can "temper rage and disappointment 
by connecting them with memories of the loving as well as 
the frustrating actions of mother" <Pine, 1985, p. 106>. 
The toddler uses these abilities to maintain autonomy while 
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retaining closeness, to regulate longing and rage, and 
eventually to regulate self-esteem. 
The "fusing the loving and hating feelings" CPine, 
1985, p. 84>, integrating "good and bad aspects of self-
representations and good and bad aspects of object-
representations," bringing together "all-good and all-bad 
self-images" (Hamilton, 1988, p. 107) describe the task of 
development during object constancy. This accomplishment 
allows the consolidation of identity with the Yecognition of 
a variety of characteristics <Hamilton, 1988). 
Emotional object constancy marks the beginning of 
"self constancy" <Hamilton, 1988) which advances intentional 
activity even while experiencing mild frustration <p. 55). 
Individuation, the process of creating a self, has begun in 
earnest as the toddler assumes characteristics which define 
itself <Pine, 1985>; it continues throughout life as one 
progYesses through later stages of development <Hamilton, 
1988). 
With attainment of object constancy, the fear of the 
loss of the love of the object replaces the fear of object 
loss <Hamilton, 1988). 
According to Blanck and Blanck (1986>, the achieve.ent 
of object constancy requires a predominance of gratifying 
experiences with the caretaker over frustrating experiences. 
A predominance of negative experiences interferes with the 
coalescense of gratifying and frustrating object images into 
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a unified person, and consequently interferes with the 
establishment of a unified self through the integration of 
various self-images. Thus, failure to achieve 
developmentally appropriate object constancy results in a 
continual "search for good self and object itaages 
perhaps throughout life" <p. S9>. 
Confusing, fr ust rating environments disrupt the 
integrating functions of the child's ego because the 
"capacity to compare and contYast emotional experience fails 
to develop •••• they remain stuck in a split, all-good and 
all-bad self- and object-experience" <Hamilton, 1988, p. 
110). 
Blanck and Blanck (1986) summarize seven functions of 
object relations: <1> the provision of safety feeling in 
. infants foy trust, adaptation, and coping; <2> establishment 
of internal regulatory functions for self-limiting behavior 
and socialization; <3> promotion of ego autonomy "through 
comfortable acquisition of functions of the object relations 
with minimal conflict" Cp. 67>; (4) serving as a model for 
character formation through selective 
identification/internalization of external objects to form 
self representations; CS> promotion of superego devalopaent 
through internalization of parental prohibitions, demands, 
and values; <6> provision of an 'ego ideal', internalized 
qualities of objects by which one measures the self in 
character formation; <7> enforcing resolution of Oedipal 
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wishes <through "love for the parent of the same sex" Cp. 
281) as identification intensifies and sexual wishes are 
repressed, thereby enabling the child to enter latency <pp. 
62-70>-. 
In a case study, Kennedy and Moran < 1984> trace the 
develop.ental history of a four-year-old boy, Tom. In the 
first weeks of his life, he received minimal care. In the 
first year, he experienced a predominance of painful 
experiences. His treatment resulted from his mother's 
depression, which resulted in rough handling and sustained 
periods of distress. The authors consider these experiences 
as laying "a foundation for an aggressive taint to his 
relationship to self and object" <p. 203). 
In his second year, Tom had many accidents. These 
resulted from his unrestrained impulse control through his 
mother's inability to set limits in a secure way. At a 
critical period of his development, Tom was "prevented fro• 
sharing in the illusion that his mother could protect him 
fro• painful experiences" <p. 203). He a 1 so showed an 
"apparent inability to be loving toward his mother ••• later 
understood as a defensive stance against a fear of loss of 
her love~ Cp. 204). 
By his third year, Tom's self-image was of an unsafe 
and unloved person. This intage increased his fear of the 
loss of his mother. His aggressive actions escalated in the 
for• of attacks on his baby sister, and he felt rejected and 
condemned by his mother. 
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He internalized his mother's 
condemnations in his developing conscience, and experienced 
guilt when he hurt his sister. Consequently, he hurt 
himself rather than his sister; hurting himself got his 
mother's attention and concern, that is, her love. It also 
a•ounted to an expression of his fear and dislike of his 
aggressive actions. Self-injury was part of his defense 
against his anger from his feeling disappointed and 
rejected. Self-injury and the experience of pain was the 
method Tom employed to get "closeness" from his mother (p. 
212). 
Satisfactory progression through the separation-
individuation process through the receipt of primarily 
gratifying interactions with caretakers results in a child 
considered competent. The child can evoke loving images of 
a person while frustrated with the person and can rely on 
these images for comfort. The child possesses the 
beginnings of a realistic self-image, adequate self-concept, 
and consequent self-confidence, and can persist with 
purposeful activity. The child's feelings toward itself and 
others are positive and include a healthy self-esteem. The 
child feels safe~y in itself and trust in others, has 
internalized the basic regulatory functions for self-
control, socialization, and conscience, and can function 
autonomously for its age, that is, can adapt to situations 
and cope constructively with frustration and disappointment. 
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As illustrated by the case of Tom, a child whose 
movement through the separation-individuation process ha-s 
taken place through primarily negatively tinged experiences 
with caretakers lacks the capacity to integrate disparate 
self and object images into a single, whole other person or 
self. Without the provision of safety from the environment, 
the child lacks trust in itself and others and a secure 
sense of self-esteem and self-confidence. The child 
perceives self and others as all-good or all-bad, that is, 
split object relations. 
Because the drive to separate predominates over the 
drive to unite, the child lacks the basis of self-esteem and 
self-nurture and the affects of frustration, disappointment, 
anger, and hostility dominate emotional functioning. The 
child has problems in self-control and regulation and 
difficulty relating to others. Along with these 
difficulties, experiences of object loss and fear of the 
loss of the object's love produce depressive reactions 
defended against by rage. The child is susceptible to 
depression. Although he or she establishes an emotional 
equilibrium, it is brittle or tenuous and disturbed through 
disappointment with an attendant loss of self-esteem. 
The child may blame itself when unloved by parents and 
develop "a schematic attitude" of a "degraded self-schema" 
in which the child believes the self is "unlovableu 
<Horowitz, 1988, p. 47>. 
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Psychological Mechanisms 
This section defines and explains the utility of 
particular terms expressed previously, such as 
identification, internalization, repression, and splitting. 
The purpose of this section is to show that the acquisition 
and use of these mechanisms contributes to the child's 
development and adaptation. 
Integration and Differentiation. Object relations 
theory posits the complementarity of these functions which 
"pervade development from the beginning and persist 
throughout 1 if e" <Hami 1 ton, 1988, p. 60). Bringing two 
mental elements together, such as "perceptions, memories, 
representations, emotions, ideas, movements" <p. 60) is the 
integrative function. Setting apart two mental elements is 
the fun ct ion of differentiation. For example, self-other 
differentiation is the result of the separation-
individuation process <Pine, 1985>. 
These processes can be disrupted in early development 
(Hamilton, 1988>: 
by strong emotions in infants •••• Longing, 
frustration, excitement, and contentment interfere 
with and alter the integrative ego functions, 
leading to projection, introjection, splitting, and 
projective i dent if i cation. These 1 ater mental 
processes are sometimes called defense mechanisms 
because they protect the self-image from a 
catastrophic loss of a sense of well-being in the 
face of overwhelming frustration. Mental defenses 
attempt to insure the integrity of a sense of self 
and often provide the emotional richness and 
complexity of our lives <p. 63). 
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Projection. Projection is a differentiating ego 
function involving the attribution of one's own unwanted 
quality to another person with a similarity to the quality, 
but in doing so exaggerates and distorts the quality. The 
infant in the symbiotic phase of development is thought to 
associate the experience of pleasure as self and the 
experience of pain as other. The self-mother unity is 
retained as good while "dual unity" is projected as bad. 
Projection is thus a form of confusion between self and 
object <Hamilton, 1988, p. 67>. 
Incorporation, intro iection, and identification. 
These functions are considered "taking in processes" 
<Hami 1 ton, 1988, p. 68). As such, they mean processes 
"whereby functions of the object representations are 
transferred to the self representations" <Blanck & Blanck, 
1 986, p • 22) • Distinctions among these functions depend on 
the infant's or child's level of development or 
structuralization, and that, according to Blanck and Blanck, 
the term internalization "obviates straining for fine 
distinction" (p. 61). Their import <Blanck & Blanck, 1986>: 
Structuralization, differentiation, and 
internalization are continuous processes. The young 
infant merges with the gratifying object-images-
exper i enc ed-as-par t-of-the-sel f-images; the 
separating-individuating toddler "absorbs" or 
transfers aspects of the object representations to 
the ever-differentiating self representations; the 
oedipal child begins to organize the precipitate of 
parental values into a value system of his or 
her own (p. 61). 
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Incorporation takes place <Hamilton, 1988> "prior to 
the development of clear self-other boundaries" (p. 68). 
Chessick <1985) considers it a "primitive kind of 
interpersonal relations fantasy •••• a form of fantasied 
'object relatedness'" <p. 6S>. 
Introjection <Hamilton, 1988> supersedes incorporation 
because the infant can distinguish between the self-image 
and object-image rather than merging the object-image with 
the self-image. The object-image is· "sufficiently vivid to 
have emotional power in the internal world" Cp. 69). It is 
thus <Chessick, 1985) "a change in psychic organization and 
in the psychic status of an object representation" <p. 66). 
Called an introject CChessick, 1985>, the internalized 
object-image is created as a response to "severe ambivalence 
or more or less ·disappointment in an attempt to modify 
distressing relations with the external object." Doing so 
reduces the influence of the object on the self (p. 66>. An 
introject <Horowitz, 1988> "is a critical 'figure' who seems 
to ·speak· in the mind in the role of someone else" Cp. 138>, 
such as a parent. 
With attainment of object constancy, introjection 
modulates into identification through the transfor•ation of 
introjects into new forms of mental representations 
<Hamilton, 1988). 
Of the internalizing processes, identification is the 
most mature and thought of as modeling, initially on 
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parents. This mental process occurs automatically, usually 
unconsciously, promotes emotional growth and adaptation, 
including "adaptation to a feared or lost object." In this 
process, the individual makes aspects of another his or her 
own CChessick, 1985, p. 65>. 
The growth-promoting and adaptive functions of 
identification describe an attribute of it termed selective 
identification, the "transfer of functions of the object 
representations to the self-representation" <Blanck & 
Blanck, 1986, p. 121). 
A protective, albeit problematic, aspect of 
identification is termed identification with the aggressor; 
it ·is employed under stressful circumstances, as in abusive 
situations: 
When a child is hurt, he has an increased need for 
those upon whom he depends. Consequently, he may 
cling even more fiercely to the very parent who 
harms him. The need for closeness leads the child 
to firmly introject the abusing parent and then 
identify with the powerful figure. The child no 
longer experiences himself as small, helpless, and 
hurt, but as big, powerful, and strong <Hamilton, 
1988, p. 117>. 
This position enhances "survival potential" <Horowitz, 
1988), but at the risk of "making others victims to avoid 
the victim role for self" Cp. 105). 
Proiective identification. Projective identification 
describes a mechanism that combines elements of 
identification and projection. This mechanis• operates by 
the projection of an aspect of the self onto the object. 
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The purpose is to "control the projected aspect of the self 
in the object" <Hamil ton, 1988, p. 87). The attempt at 
control indicates an awareness that on some level what is 
projected is a part of oneself <Hamilton, 1988). 
The initial attempts of the symbiotic child to 
differentiate self from object constitute partial attempts, 
sinri.lar to the integration of self-images and object-images. 
As the child moves from symbiosis into separation-
individuation, the distinction between self and object 
becomes clearer. Children "attribute their own feelings to 
their parent and try to control those feelings in that 
parent" <Hamilton, 1988, p. 95). The feelings projected 
range from hostility to affection, such as the sharing of 
happiness and expressing concern manifest by rapprochement 
subphase children <Hamilton, 1988). 
The combination of projection and introjection become 
used for "the acquisition of information for inclusion in 
the superego demands" <Sarnoff, 1987, p. 337). If a child 
projects hostility onto a parent, the child will introject 
images of a hostile and punitive parent. The child's self-
image will include elements of hostility and aggression. 
The child also projects interpretations onto the environment 
and uses resulting information to adjust self-image and 
behavior. That is, environmental influence, reality, and 
memory operate in the service of emotional and behavioral 
expectations <Sarnoff, 1987). 
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Sarnoff <1987) considers that the extent to which 
reality experiences can promote corrections of perceptions 
depends upon the rigidity that prior beliefs are held. The 
more investment in existing beliefs <"narcissistic libidinal 
energies") the less will reality experiences serve to modify 
the•. This results in rigid self-images and environmental 
expectations whose outcomes include "pathological patterns" 
(pp. 337-338). 
Splitting. Sp 1 it ting <Blanck & Blanck, 1979) is a 
"feature of the developmental phase before the attainment of 
the abi 1 i ty to tolerate that good and bad object images 
refer to the same whole person" (p. 144>. It is 
the active keeping apart of contradictory internal 
experiences of the self and of significant others. 
These contradictory elements remain conscious, but 
are separated in time or space, and do not influence 
one another <Hamilton, 1988, p. 76>. 
Splitting transforms into <Pine, 1985) "a defense that 
functions to preserve the representation of the love object 
from the destructive forces of hate but simultaneously 
permits the luxuriant growth of hate, unmodified by (because 
split off from) love" Cp. 84>. "Often the same person will 
be alternately idealized and devalued" <Horowitz, 1988, p. 
195). Thus, "only one set of memories is available to 
experience at a time. Self-coherence is protected at the 
expense of developing realistic working models" of the self 
<Horowitz, 1988, p. 107). 
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This chapter categorizes developmental object 
relations theory within the parameters of developmental 
psychopathology. It then states criticisms of the theory 
followed by a description of it by contemporary 
theoreticians, including the development of psychological 
mechanisms. 
The explication of both the separation-individuation 
process and the acquisition and utilizati•::>n of psychological 
mechanisms has attempted to show how these integrating and 
differentiating functions unfold as interrelating components 
of object relations development in both normal and distorted 
development. It has attempted to demonstrate how early 
disturbances in object relations create a child with a 
tenuous emotional equilibrium, one which is susceptible to 
depression through object loss and through difficulty 
integrating good and bad aspects of persons into consistent 
object-images and a stable self-image. The result is a 
child with low self-esteem dominated by hostile affects who 
relies on less developed psychological mechanisms in the 
process of development. 
The following chapter defines latency and describes 
emotional development during latency. 
CHAPTER III 
LATENCY 
In their overview of latency, Shapiro and Perry <1980> 
reviewed findings fro• developmental psychology although 
they write fro• a psychoanalytic perspective. They hold 
"that latency is biological in origin and relatively 
i--..tabl• in the .arch of davelop .. nt" <p. 163>. They cite 
the "functional changes in the child's neurobiologica-1 r 
perceptual, and cognitive development" which come together 
around age sev•nJ these changes . "in the organization of 
mental life and their dynamic concOtRitants provide latency 
with the behaviors that characterize this stage" Cp. 162). 
They al so cite "perceptual-postural aaturation •••• 
te•porospatial orientation •••• and cognitive changes at 
seven" <pp. 168-170>. Regarding cognitive changes, they 
note research relating cognitiv• •aturity and •oral 
judg•ent, cognitive mediation between thought and action, 
and the de•onstration of •reasoningr insight, and 
inferential behavior" < pp. 170-173). "Mediated," that is, 
"more structured," thought processes, the secondary process, 
ar• replacing "original associational" thought processes, 
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the primary process, because the "energies underlying the• 
are relatively bound" <pp. 173-175). These changes account 
for latency's onset rather a "biphasic growth of the sexual 
drive" Cp. 173). 
A greater degree of autonomy marks the normal latency 
child. This permits less emotional dependence on family and 
an increased capacity to exercise control over the 
environment. Related developmental achievements include the 
ability to delay action and to inhibit drive impulses, 
including sexual impulses. 
Secondary thought processes allow the child to obey 
internal cues such as prohibitions on behavior. The 
capacity to exercise the superego <conscience>, that is, 
"the replacement of outer control by inner control and the 
.consequent propensity toward conflict may have a 
material base in the establishment of neurodevelopmental 
structure" <p. 176). 
Sarnoff <1987) describes the developmental period of 
latency as follows: 
Latency is here used to describe a period of dynamic 
defenses during which the child experiences a 
complex reorganization of the defensive structure of 
the ego. A state of good behavior, pliability, and 
educability is maintained as a result of an 
equilibrium between defenses and drives. This state 
is possible because of the evolution and ontogenesis 
of mechanisms of defense that can produce it. It is 
not obligatory, however, and is facultatively 
present at the discretion of the culture in which 
the individual lives Cp. 5). 
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Defense mechanisms undergo developmental alterations 
in latency which are adaptive. For example, fears of 
persecution are defended against by projection. Repression 
lacks the strength it will have later in development. The 
child's egocentrism strengthens denial <Sarnoff, 1987). 
Sarnoff lists the defenses of sublimation (replacing 
"an unacceptable wish with a course of action that is 
similar to the wish but does not conflict with one's value 
system" [Horowitz, 1988, p. 1951>; obsessive-compulsive 
activities Ce.g, stamp collecting>; doing and undoing 
<unconsciously erasing a consciously intolerable action, 
"thought, wish, impulse" [Laughlin, 1983, p. 428J>; reaction 
formation <replacing a "warded-off idea or feeling ••• by an 
unconsciously derived but consciously felt emphasis on its 
opposite [Horowitz, 1988, p. 1941>; and repression 
("withholding from conscious awareness an idea or a feeling" 
[Horowitz, 1988, p. 1951> whose "activities produce the 
psychological state of calm, pliability, and educability •••• 
They help the child to adapt to a world requiring social 
compliance and the ability to acquire knowledge" <p. 6). 
They also "provide for the interposition of modifications of 
aggression" (p. 5). 
The child capable of entering the state of latency can 
utilize these relatively more advanced defenses for 
adaptation and rely on them to a greater extent than the 
more primitive defenses which characterize earlier stages of 
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development, e. g, projection, introject ion, and denial; 
turning against the self, displacement <Blanck and Blanck, 
1974). 
Coincident with the development of defenses for 
adaptation is the development of cognition from the primary 
processes of memory traces, delay, perception, motility, 
intentionality, reality testing, locomotion, object 
comprehension, speech, to the secondary functions of 
concrete operational thought and abstract thought <Blanck 
and Blanck, 1974>. Concrete operational thinking <Sarnoff, 
1987) describes 
a step in the improvement of reality testing which 
begins at 7 1/2 years of age •••• The importance of 
this development to the state of latency is that 
fantasies, which are under the impact of improved 
reality testing, become less useful for discharge of 
drives <p. 11>. 
Sarnoff <1987> adds that "during latency many verbal 
concepts are remembered in association with high charges of 
affect" Cp. 10). Piaget and Inhelder <1969) add that 
"affectivity constitutes the energetics of behavior 
patterns whose cognitive aspect refers to the structures 
alone. There is no behavior pattern, however intellectual, 
which does not involve affective factors as motives" <p. 
158). 
Fantasy in Latency 
Laughlin <1983) defines fantasy as "an imaginary 
sequence of events or mental images which seek to resolve 
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emotional conflict" <p. 110). Fantasy provides imaginary 
gratification, substitutes for proscribed actions, permits 
the indulgence of unacceptable sexual or aggressive 
impulses, and promotes the planning of future action. 
Defensive and adaptive functions. Ausubel <1952> 
considers fantasy a withdrawal technique, along with 
negativism and insulation; they "remove the self beyond the 
reach of threatening influences in the distasteful 
environment, and make it invulnerable to attack •••• " (p. 
18)·. Anna Freud <1966) notes that fantasy provides the ego 
with "the power of surmounting considerable quantities of 
objective unpl easure" <p. 81 >, and that "the method of 
denial, upon which is based the fantasy of the reversal of 
the real facts into their opposite, is employed in 
situations in which it is impossible to escape some painful 
external impression" <p. 93). 
Fantasy thus assists the latency child in adapting to 
a variety of situations in that "magical adjustments to 
problems become possible. In latency, this is necessary for 
the most part because of the limited physical and sexual 
equipment of the child" <Sarnoff, 1987, p. 229>. 
Sarnoff (1987) explains that the child, when 
confronted by situations in reality which cannot yet be 
mastered, uses "fantasy formation, regression, and 
restraint •••• The goal is to master intrapsychically what is 
otherwise impossible to master in reality" <p. 48). 
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The formation of fantasy takes the following 
process <Sarnoff, 1987>: The child initially remembers the 
stressful experience, such as humiliation, physical or 
sexual abuse. Then, repression is used to shatter the 
memory and displace its fragments "onto symbolic 
representations that are then elaborated and synthesized 
into a series of coherent conscious fantasies. These 
fantasies discharge the drives and protect the mental 
equilibrium of the latency state" Cp. 31>. 
Thus <Sarnoff, 1987>: 
the child quells the humiliation of trauma and the 
excitement of drive activation through seduction by 
dismantling the memories of the traumatic events or 
seduction and the latent fantasies that they stir 
up •••• By reliving events couched in the symbols and 
stories of latency play, the child is able to find 
an outlet for his heightened drives and yet maintain 
a state of latency. Thus, he gains comfort or 
revenge without threatening the situation in which 
he hopes to function well <i.e., school) or 
interfering with his emotional equilibrium or 
adjustment <p. 234). 
The use of fantasy to deny "the existence of objective 
sources of anxiety and unpleasure <Freud, 1966) is 
wholly inconsistent with ••• its capacity to recognize and 
critically to test the reality of objects" Cp. 80). Freud 
<1966) adds that the developing ability to test reality 
reduces and then eliminates the reliance on fantasy as an 
adaptive defense against trauma. It loses its utility when 
it disturbs the capacity for reality testing. 
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The structure of latency enables the child between 
ages six and twelve to meet the developmental tasks of this 
period of maturation and development. A• the child proceeds 
through latency, the reliance on denial in fantasy to master 
trauma in reality becomes less functional or adaptive as the 
capacity for reality testing improves. Stresses which 
exceed- the child's capacity for reliance upon the structure 
of latency, particularly loss events, are the focus of the 
following sections. 
Reactions to Loss 
According to Nager a ( 1981 >, "most observations 
indicate that latency children deal with ser-ious losses, 
through death, with massive denial, including denial of 
affect and not infrequently even reversal of affect" <p. 
384). While mourning, the child may create 
a fantasy life where the lost object may be seen as 
alive and at ti mes as ideal. • • • not a suit ab 1 e 
substitute for an absent parent, but it may well be 
an unavoidable alternative, especially if suitable 
substitutes are not readily available to the child 
(p. 385). 
Also <Nagera, 1981), observation of the behavior of 
children suffering loss suggests little overt effects of 
grief, the consequences of the loss produce alterations 
which may affect subsequent development. Rather than mourn, 
children manifest disorders of behavior and other symptoms. 
Wolfenstein (1969) identified adaptive substitutes for 
mourning. One is the provision of a substitute parent. The 
42 
child can form an attachment to this person and 
simultaneously "detach" from the parent. Or, the child can 
use the memory of the lost parent and admiration to form the 
standard--"ego ideal"-- to which the child can aspire Cp. 
458). 
Maladaptive reactions <Wolfenstein, 1969) are 
expressed as rage rather than as grief. The rage is 
directed at others in order not to lose the "representation 
of the lost parent" Cp. 459). Bowlby <1980) adds that the 
experience of a "childhood bereavement" predisposes one to 
psychiatric disorder which includes the risk of "serious 
suicidal ideation, anxious dependence on another, and major 
depressive disorder <psychotic)" (pp. 300-301). 
Bowlby <1980) also reports a study by Cain and Fast 
(1972> which found that in children whose parent had 
committed suicide a high incidence of psychopathology 
existed and was compounded if the children had been made to 
feel guilty and responsible for a parent's condition and if 
the reason for the parent's death was told to the child 
contrary to the reality known by the child. Symptoms 
inc 1 uded di st rust of others and themselves, i nhi bi ted 
curiosity, and "a tendency to find everything unreal 11 <p. 
388). 
Even the loss of a "feeling of well-being previously 
experienced by the child" interferes with the child's 
development <Toolan, 1981, p. 316). The loss of a loved one 
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<Toolan, 1962) causes the child to hate the lost object 
through feelings of abandonment. This includes experiences 
of neglect. Dependent upon the parents for love and 
sustenance, the child maintains the hope that the parents 
will supply the needed support. The defenses of repression 
and denial are utilized to protect against the child's 
comprehension of the situation, and the child begins to 
think of himself as bad rather than the parents. As reality 
testing improves with maturation, these defenses no longer 
suffice to protect the child. Hostility and increasing 
guilt replace them. While this occurs, the inter-nalizing 
processes of introjection and identification operate in the 
process of personality formation, and "hostili~y previously 
directed towards the parents is directed towards their 
introjects within the child" <p. 723). 
Depression in Latency 
Schecter (1957) emphasizes the child's dependence on 
the parent, the 11 love object.... Thus, whenever children 
feel the threat of the loss of a love object, they not only 
develop feelings of rage toward the frustrating object, but 
feelings of helplessness and of worthlessness as well" <pp. 
131-132>. He considers this reaction a depression, or its 
equivalent. Sarnoff <1987> reviews "three distinct clinical 
entities" associated with clinical depression in latency: 
"emotional acrescentism <affect starvation>, frank 
depression, and depressive equivalents" <p. 219>. Affect 
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starved children "tend to form quick and very close 
attachments with older people but appear incapable of 
remembering the good things that were done for them by the 
people to whom they attach themselves" <p. 219). 
In early latency, they do not appear depressed, "but 
they become resentful, angry, and depressed in late latency" 
<Sarnoff, 1987, p. 219). These children perceive people as 
cruel, unreliable, and untrustworthy because of their own 
inability to create a "reassuring image of a new object." 
Their need for nurture goes unfulfilled in that they cannot 
establish a "relationship close enough to produce a sense of 
loss that would limit hostile, demanding, regressive states" 
<Sarnoff, 1987, p. 219). They feel betrayed and lonely, and 
have expectations of hopelessness. 
depression. 
They are susceptible to 
The denial and fantasy of affect-starved children 
defend against depression until they reach the age of 
eleven, when their reality testing overrides fantasy. They 
may begin stealing and acting out with hostile aggression 
followed by "suicidal ideation and manifest depressive 
affects •••• Rare is the person in this group who has 
depression with guilt" <Sarnoff, 1987, p. 220). 
Latency age children <Sarnoff, 1987> suffering from 
frank depression 11 mani fest sustained clinically depressed 
moods" <p. 221 >. Other signs include anhedonia, dysphoria, 
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and "accident proneness and direction of aggression toward 
the self, such as suicide attempts" Cp. 221). 
Depressive equivalents in latency appear to reduce and 
shorten "the symptomatology of clinical depression ••• and 
the patients manifest their depressive illness in masked and 
cryptic forms" <Sarnoff, 1987, p. 222>. Sarnoff considers 
the structure of latency to constitute the phenomenon which 
"alters the course of the symptomatology of clinical 
depression in the majority of patients" Cp. 222). The 
child's defenses follow the pattern described above in order 
to endure or obliterate their painful affects, including 
depressive ones. "Therefore, even severe depressive states 
during latency show less depressive affect than is found in 
their adult equivalents" Cp. 222). 
Common sources of depression include anger arousing 
situations with no outlet for its expression and the 
experience of humiliation. The mechanisms of projection and 
actualization enable the child to master humiliation in 
displacement. That is, other children, onto whom 
displacement occurs, serve the child's purpose as play 
symbols. The child uses them, the actualization, in 
fantasies of mastery <Sarnoff, 1987). 
The successful operation of these mechanisms turns 
hostile aggression from the child. Their failure results in 
observable manifestations of depression, that is, 
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"aggressive energies turn inward, and depressive 
symptomatology is released" <Sarnoff, 1987, p. 224). 
Sarnoff specifically recognizes suicidal behavior as 
an element of two of the three types of depression attendant 
to latency--af fect starvation and frank depression. The 
manifest symptomatology of these types illustrate the 
tenuousness of the structure of latency in particular groups 
of children. Affect starved children have only partially 
created a latency structure and depressed children may have 
"lost" its protection, had they enjoyed it previously. In 
particular, the depression of affect starved children 
includes elements--object hunger, hopelessness--resulting 
from disturbances in early object relations development. 
The predominant and manifest affect, rage, constitutes 
these children's reactions to object loss. Rel eased upon 
the environment and/or themselves in self-destructive 
actions through the force of unrestrained aggression, their 
aggression disrupts the relative protection of the structure 
of latency. 
These children are left to rely on psychological 
mechanisms <ego defenses> characteristic of normal 
development during the separation-individuation process. 
For latency-age children, the defenses can be considered 
maladaptive, age inappropriate, or primitive. They 
represent chi 1 dren who have not acquired a structure of 
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latency proper, or who have regressed from a previously 
established structure of latency. 
CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW Or THE LITERATURE 
Research on suicidal behavior in latency children has 
typically focused on their family environments, affective 
states, and aspects of ego functioning such as cognitive 
functioning <including reality testing) and cognitive 
development, concepts of death, fantasy, coping strategies, 
and ego defenses. Other research has examined suicidal 
children's attitudes towards life and death, and their 
motivations for suicide. 
FAMILY ENVIRONMENT Or SUICIDAL CHILDREN 
Asarnow, Carlson, and Guthrie <1'987) found that 
"children who attempted suicide saw their families as less 
cohesive, higher in conflict, and less controlled than did 
nonsuic idal children" <p. 364). Pfeffer < 1 '981b) identified 
five features of the families of suicidal children marked by 
their intensity and chronicity: 1. lack of generational 
boundaries manifest by "expressed hosti 1 i ty, feelings of 
deprivation, low self-esteem, and magnified attachment to 
the parents' families of origin" Cp. 331>; 2. severely 
conflicted spouse relationships including the ever-present 
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threat of separation, frequent depression or suicidal 
tendencies; 3. par-ental feelings projected onto the child, 
both libidinal and aggressive; 4. symbiotic parent-child 
relationship interfering with the child's developing 
autonomy; 5. inflexible family system in which "change is 
felt as a threat to the survival of the family" <pp. 331-
332). 
Coinciding with these five features is the "expendable 
child concept" <Pfeffer, 1987>, a term devised by Sabbath, 
which postulates that parents harbor 
conscious and unconscious ••• wishes that a child 
must die. The parents view a child as expendable 
and a child perceives the parents as oppressors. 
When such a dynamic is operative, families have 
great difficulty in appreciating the life-
threatening state of a child (p. 181). 
What Pfeffer (1982b) considers unique about the family 
of the suicidal child is: 
the intensity and unchangeabi 1 i ty of perceptions, 
fantasies, wishes, anxieties, fears, and 
interactions of family members. Furthermore, the 
similarities described for families of suicidal 
children and fami 1 ies of schizophrenic and 
borderline children may, in part, elucidate why 
there is such a high frequency of suicidal behavior 
among schizophrenic and borderline children (pp. 
241-242). 
Kosky, Silburn, and Zubrick (1986) compared 481 
children with symptomatic depression with 147 children with 
depression and suicidal ideation. They found that the 
suicidal ideation group had disturbances in child-father and 
child-sibling relationships "characterized by persistent 
discord, and the chi 1 d was more 1 i kel y to suffer from 
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persecution, host i 1 i ty, and child abuse" <p. 524>. Both 
groups had high levels of disturbance in child-mother 
relationships. "The vast majority of all cases recorded as 
positive for suicidal ideation were al so positive for 
symptomatic depression" <p. 526>. Other psychiatric 
diagnoses did not "show specific links with suicidal 
ideation" <p. 527>; neither did they confirm a relationship 
between loss and suicidal thoughts: 
Whether or not children developed suicidal ideation 
depended significantly on the family relationships. 
Discordant, hostile family interactions predisposed 
to suicidal thoughts. Family history of psychiatric 
disorder or suicide was not associated with suicidal 
ideation in children. Extrafamilial stresses and 
other influences previously identified as being 
associated with suicidal behavior in children, such 
as experiences of loss, were also not found to 
differentiate between the two depressed groups Cp. 
527). 
These findings point toward families in which children 
actively involve themselves in family interactions as 
recipients of parental hostility and its attendant 
rejection. 
Cohen-Sandler, Ber•an, and King <1982) found that 
suicidal children usually remained intensely 
involved with family members and peers. In fact, 
their investment in these relationships was often 
expressed as rage; nearly two-thirds of suicidal 
children also made homicidal threats, gestures, or 
attempts <p. 184>. 
They consider children's suicidal behavior a result of 
a modeling process whereby parents, although they 
themselves were not suicidal, did present to the 
potentially suicidal child an example of 
interpersonal conflict, avoidance, impulsivity, and 
lack of more adaptive coping skills •••• In a context 
of repeated losses and stressful experiences, 
children's self-destructive and/or homicidal 
behavior seem to be last ditch strategies to affect 
or coerce those who threaten their psychological 
well-being <pp. 184-185). 
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Friedman, Corn, Hurt, Fibel, Schulick, and Swirsky 
< 1984) compared 16 suicidal, depressed adolescents with 18 
non-suicidal, depressed ones. They interviewed the subjects 
using the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia 
and made diagnoses using Research Diagnostic Criteria and 
the DSM-I I I. Thirteen of the suicidal subjects and 14 of 
the non-suicidals were diagnosed with personality disorders. 
Both groups' fami 1 ies had no differences in psychiatric 
disorders, but the distinguishing factor <p<.02> separating 
the suicidal group was "the chronic illness of a parent 
during the adolescent's childhood or latency years, 
particularly depression," 63'1. compared with 22'1. <p. 395). 
Chronicity was measured at more than 24 weeks; it actually 
measured in years. 
Pfeffer, Conte, Plutchik, and Jerret (1980) found no 
difference in "psychopathology, including severe depression, 
psychiatric hospitalization, and alcohol and drug abuse ••• 
marital tensions, separations, parental violence, and child 
abuse" in the parents of outpatient children evaluated for 
suicidal behavior Cp. 706>. Parents of children considered 
suicidal had significantly more suicidal ideation <p. 707>. 
Parents seemed incapable of appropriately responding 
to their child's developmental needs because they 
lacked awareness and knowledge of child development, 
and lft<>st significantly because of serious problems 
with object relations. The parents appeared to be 
very dependent, lacked the ability to delay 
gratification, were subject to intense mood shifts, 
and lacked internalization of appropriate parenting 
qualities. They seemed not to be able to 
differentiate their needs from those of their 
children •••• The suicidal children frequently blamed 
themselves for family problems, were unable to 
develop trust, and felt they were bad and in need of 
punishment <p. 709). 
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Pfeffer, Plutchik, and Mizruchi (1983) found that 
children they labeled "assaultive-only" and "assaultive-
suicidal experienced significantly more parental 
violence than" non-assaultive, nonsuicidal children and 
suicidal-only children Cp. 155). Parents of both groups of 
suicidal children "had significantly more suicidal behavior 
than the parents of the other children" Cp. 155). 
In Australia, Kosky (1983) compared 20 suicidal 
chldren under age 14 with 50 psychiatric controls. Sixty-
five percent of the suicidal children had witnessed 
physically violent arguments between parents; sixty percent 
had received parental abuse. Non-suicidal children rarely 
experienced violence. 
In a study of 34 children identified as severely 
depressed and suicidal or self-abusive, Paulson, Stone, and 
Sposto <1978> cite "the identity diffusion and ego 
frag•entation of many suicidal families, where emotional 
disorganization, and severe depression are primary 
correlates of a markedly pathological home environment" Cp. 
227>. They found "a significant association ••• · between the 
violence in the ideational processes, the mutilating assault 
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upon the body, and the extreme chaotic, disorganized state 
of the family" Cp. 233). "Violent fighting by means of 
knives, razors, and guns was, for several homes, the family 
vehicle for expressing conflict" (p. 238). 
Using a chart analysis method, Myers, Burke, and 
McCauley <1985> identified 17.57. of 346 inpatients aged 5 to 
13 ·as acutely suicidal. They found that family violence, 
especially between biological parents, discriminated 
suicidal from nonsuicidal children. They found that 
violence distinguished depressive suicidal children from 
conduct disordered ones. They also identified a pattern 
between parental violence and suicidal behavior: 
Parental suicidal behavior is related to the 
expression of childhood suicidal activity, although 
not its severity •••• The underlying psychopathology 
may then be conceptualized as an impulse dyscontrol 
which predisposes aggression •••• The development of 
self-directed violence may depend upon another risk 
factor acting synergistically with this existing 
psychopathology, e.g., parental depression, and 
acute 1 i fe stress. In this context childhood 
suicide may be viewed as a final common pathway for 
a heterogeneous group of children sharing a tendency 
toward aggression.... This child's recurrent 
attempts, early developmental history, and a family 
history of alcoholism and violence all suggest a 
developing character pathology, evident before 
puberty, despite the acute depressive symptomatology 
Cp. 479>. 
Shafii, Carrigan, Whittinghill, and Derrick <1985> 
conducted psychological autopsies on 20 suicide victims by 
interviewing their families, relatives, and others such as 
teachers, ministers, and physicians. For controls, the 
researchers used victims' friends and their families <n=17>. 
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Distinguishing significantly between suicidal victims' 
families and the controls were a prevalence of suicidal 
behavior among parents, relatives, friends, parental history 
of emotional problems, parental absence, and physical or 
emotional abuse. 
Orbach, Gross, and Glaubman <1981) interviewed the 
families of 11 latency age children who had either 
threatened or attempted suicide. No control group was used. 
They found that "seven out of the eleven children had one 
parent·, usually the mother, who exhibited suicidal behavior 
or ideation to some degree" <p. 182>. 
In 10 of the 11 fami 1 ies, a major crisis, usually 
centering around a handicapped sibling, required the 
suicidal child to relinquish needs in order to assist the 
family. Nine of the children felt the demands of parents 
exceeded their capacities, and "a refusal to comply was 
followed by punishment, withdrawal of love, or inducement of 
strong guilt feelings" <p. 183). 
Findings led the authors to conclude 
that suicide in youngsters is an end result of an 
acting out process of the family's unconscious 
suicidal behavior. Similarly, Ackerly <1967> 
posited that suicidal children identify with the 
suicidal parent and act out the parent's self-
destructive wishes Cp. 182>. 
Rosenthal, Rosenthal, Doherty, and Santora <1986) 
compared nine, hospitalized, suicidal preschoolers, mean age 
four , w i t h 16 s u i c i d a 1 out pat i en t s and · 1 6 be ha vi or -
disordered outpatients. Family psychiatric history did not 
55 
·di st i n g u i sh su i c i d a 1 i n pat i en ts and out pat i ent s; it did 
distinguish suicidal inpatients from behavior-disordered 
ones. Over half <SSX> the mothers of suicidal inpatients 
had been diagnosed with a depressive disorder compounded by 
substance abuse, and forty percent had at least one family 
member who had attempted suicide. 
Research findings appear consistent in describing 
family environments of suicidal children as inimical to 
children's normal development. Suicidal children exist in 
families characterized by extreme rigidity, intense 
involvement combined with the threat of separation, parental 
use of children to gratify their emotional needs, parental 
depression and suicidal behavior, and parent al host i 1 it y, 
violence, and abuse. 
The expression of hostility between parents and 
directed toward children appears as a distinguishing factor 
in ten of the studies cited. Others include parental 
suicidal ideation and/or behavior, cited in four of the 
studies. The identification of this variable seems critical 
in that i t appears to di st i n gu i sh violent chi l dr en fr om 
violent, suicidal ones. 
Parental suicidal behavior and attitudes reflect 
Moverriding egocentrisM, coupled with a tendency toward 
intense jealousy and manipulation of love objects," which 
prevent a child from taking in positive attributes of the 
nonsuicidal parent <Hutchinson le Dragun, 1987, p. 292). 
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With the stress of parental hostility and violence, children 
have to adapt to chronic, stressful, chaotic environments. 
Doing so involves the internalization of parental behaviors, 
thoughts, and coping t ec hni ques. Host i 1 e aggression 
dominates the internalized object-representations. The 
child's resulting self-image includes elements of hostility 
and a predisposition to violent behavior. 
LOSS, DEPRESSION, HOPELESSNESS 
Shaffer <1974) speculates that "changes in the 
phenomenology of depression which makes the child less 
likely to commit suicide before puberty" <p. 286) accounts 
for the relatively few suicides by latency children. He 
adds, "it may be that feelings of hopelessness which lead to 
the thought of suicide only become manifest at puberty" <p. 
286). 
Sh aw and Sc hel kun < 1965 > hold that ti The most 
significant environmental factor seems to be the element of 
loss--a death, desertion, or separation which traumatically 
alters the child's environment ti <p. 160). 
Kosky <1983), cited above, found significant 
differences regarding loss experiences between 
suicidal children and 50 psychiatric controls. 
the 20 
Eighty 
percent of the suicidal children reported loss of a parent 
by separation or death, twenty percent the loss of a 
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grandparent or sibling or pet or possessions, thirty percent 
more than one loss. 
In a study of 102 psychiatrically referred children 
and adolescents, Carl son and Cant we I l < 1982) used the 
Children's Depression Inventory and a semistructured 
interview to identify groups of suicidal ideators and 
attemptors. They found that "feelings of hopelessness" 
failed to distinguish suicide attempters and nonattempters 
and children and adolescents. Attempters measured only 
slightly more depressed than nonattempters <p. 365). They 
made a c 1 i n i c a 1 f i n d i n g " t hat t he r at e o f r e po r t ed 
depressive phenomenology increases across increasingly 
suicidal youngsters and that the number of subjects with 
family members reporting no psychiatric disorder decreases" 
<p. 366). They conclude 
that the relationship of suicidal ideation, 
depression, and depressive disorder is clearer than 
that between suicide attempt and depression. 
Suicidal ideation is perhaps a barometer of the 
severity of depression in many young people 
regardless of age (p. 367). 
Cohen-Sandler, Berman, and King <1982> reviewed the 
medical records of 76 children as they were discharged from 
a psychiatric hospital. Two trained raters, who did not 
know the experimental hypotheses, assigned each child to a 
suicidal group, a depressed, nonsuicidal group, or a control 
group. Assignment to the suicidal group required suicidal 
behavior or verbalizations. Twenty (267.) of the children 
were considered suicidal, 21 depressed, and 35 controls. 
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Seventy percent of the suicidals had received borderline 
personality diagnoses in their discharge diagnoses, compared 
with 33X of the depressed and 29X of the controls. 
Depression was diagnosed in 65X of the suicidal children, 
but suicidal behavior occurred in only 38X of depressed 
children. 
The suicidal children, compared with depressed and 
control groups, experienced more frequent losses of parents 
and grandparents the year prior to hospital admission. 
Of the 100 symptoms evaluated, two, "depressed affect 
and threatening people •••• specifically characterized the 
suicidal group" <Cohen-Sandler et al., 1982, p. 185). Fifty 
percent of the suicidals expressed threats compared with 10X 
of the depressed and 11X of controls. Considering the 
stressful life events and numerous losses of the suicidal 
children, the authors consider the distinguishing symptoms 
"internalized and outwardly expressed rage" reactions to 
their situations (1982, p. 185). 
Kazdin, French, Unis, Esveldt-Dawson, and Sherick 
( 1983): 
examined if hopelessness discriminated between 
suicidal and nonsuicidal patients and if 
hopelessness, depression, and suicidal intent were 
interrelated among children in the way they have 
been among adults Cp. 504). 
Depression measures assessed current symptomatology; 
hopelessness assessed future expectation. . They found 
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suicidal intent "more clearly related to the degree of 
hopelessness than to severity of depression" <p. 508): 
The relationship between suicidal intent and 
depression was not significant when hopelessness was 
controlled statistically. In contrast, the 
relationship between suicidal intent and 
hopelessness remained relatively constant whether or 
not severity of depression was controlled •••• 
<Children) who attempted suicide were not 
significantly different in their hopelessness from 
those who threatened or repeatedly thought about 
suicide. Thus, hopelessness may predict children's 
thoughts about suicide, but other variables 
appar-ent 1 y dictate whether an actual attempt is 
made. Nevertheless, hopelessness may still be 
clinically useful as one r-isk factor for suicidal 
intent (p. 50'3). 
Garfinkel, FYoese, and Hood (1'382>, by reviewing 
emeYgency hospital admissions of chi ldYen and adolescents 
over a seven-year period, found the 505 suicidal children 
exhibited significantly more dysphoric affect, hostility and 
aggressiveness, and stronger reaction to crisis than did the 
same number of controls. 
In a study of suicidal behavior in 101 "randomly 
selected preadolescent school children," Pfeffer, Zuckerman, 
Plutchik, and Mizruchi (1984, p. 416) identified 12 
considered suicidal, 9 because of ideation, 3 because of 
threats or attempts. Factors associated with these 12 
children included recent depression and depression in the 
child's history, but no major depression. Recent and past 
depression also correlated significantly with suicidal 
behavior in child psychiatric inpatients and outpatients 
Pfeffer, Plutchik, Mizruchi, and Lipkins (1986). 
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Orvaschel, Walsh-Allis, and Ve <1988) formed two groups 
of children, high-risk and low-risk. The high-risk group 
consisted of 61 children from 34 families in which a parent 
had experienced at least three episodes of major depressive 
disorder. The low-risk group consisted of 45 children from 
29 f ami 1 i es from a community; neither parent met DSM-I I I 
criteria for any Axis I psychiatric disorder. "Forty-one 
percent of high-risk children met criteria for at least one 
psychiatric disorder, at some time in their lives, compared 
with 15.27. of low-risk children •••• the high-risk group more 
frequently met criteria for multiple diagnoses" <p. 21). Of 
import, "al 1 the females had a prepubertal onset of 
affective illness, as did all but one of the males" Cp. 23). 
The findings of Cohen-Sandler et al. <1982) and Kosky 
(1983> appear to demonstrate an inordinate number and 
frequency of loss events experienced by suicidal children. 
Findings regarding depression and suicidal behavior show 
relationships between severity of depression and suicidal 
behavior. That is, the more severe a chi Id's depression, 
the more lethal attempt the child will make. Findings also 
suggest that the relationship between depression and suicide 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient predictor of 
suicidal behavior. That is, not all seriously depressed 
children attempt suicide, nor are all suicidal children 
depressed, at least according to the measures used. 
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The relationships among hopelessness, depression, and 
suicide al so appear mixed. Car 1 son and Cantwel 1 's < 1982) 
study found that hopelessness failed to discriminate between 
attemptors and nonattemptors as well as between children and 
adolescents. This finding disputes Shaffer's comment 
regarding a change in children's hopelessness and depression 
at puberty. Kazdin et al. <1983) found hopelessness had a 
greater relationship with suicidal behavior than did 
depression although they consider that other variables must 
operate in order for suicidal behavior to occur. Suicidal 
ideation constitutes one of the other variables and will be 
addressed in subsequent sections. 
Depressed affect and hostility expressed toward others 
in the form of threats appeared as discriminating variables 
in two studies, Garfinkel et al. (1982) and Cohen-Sandler et 
al. <1982) and in the latter as the only two distinguishing 
symptoms. Cohen-Sandler et al. < 1982) interpret these 
variables as rage expressed inwardly and outwardly as "last-
di tch strategies to affect or coerce those who threaten 
their psychological well-being" Cp. 185). Because those who 
threaten children's well-being are primarily their parents, 
and because suicidal children appear involved in chaotic, 
hostile, violent families, their mistreatment and its 
effects may constitute a critical variable in their suicidal 
behavior. 
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Feelings of hopelessness, or more accurately, an 
attitude of hopelessness CK. Smith, personal communication, 
March 20, 1987> may contribute to the dangerousness of a 
suicide attempt in a depressed, angry child for whom the 
future appears futile. Two studies <Kosky, 1983, Kazdin et 
al., 1983), and one report, <Shaw 8c Schelkun, 1965>, 
identify a relationship between hopelessness and suicidal 
behavior, although one <Carlson & Cantwell, 1982), did not. 
COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING 
Concepts of Death 
Orbach, Rosenheim, and Hary (1987), used their 
Suicidal Tendencies Test with three groups of children--
suicidal <n = 27>, chronically ill (n = 25), normal <n = 
23)--aged six to twelve. The test consists of four stories 
about an animal who is changed into an inaminate object, or 
an object into an animal. The stories elicit attitudes 
about the attraction to life and death or repulsion to life 
and death. Children retell the stories, state their 
meanings, and explain their responses. On the attraction to 
death story, the examiner, a psychologist trained in 
administration but without knowledge of the specifics of the 
attitudes measured, first told the respondents that other 
children responded differently and asked the child to state 
why another child might answer differently. This 
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yequi rement constituted the "measure of flexibi 1 i ty for 
alternative ideas" Cp. 182>. 
Results showed the suicidal children "unable to 
produce alternative attitudes toward life and death compared 
w i t h no Y ma 1 or- ch Y on i c a 1 1 y i 11 chi 1 dr- en" < p. 184 > • The 
suicidal childr-en who did demonstrate the ability to produce 
alter-natives also displayed, unlike the other two groups, a 
significant relationship between alternatives and their 
attraction to death Cp. 184>. This "cognitive 
inflexibility" limits "the child's scope of possible 
solutions or coping techniques and suicidal behavior 
prevails" (pp. 181, 184). 
Or-bach and Glaubman (1979b) conclude fr-om three case 
studies of suicidal children that their behavior 
seemed to be related to di stor-ted, idiosyncratic 
death concepts. Death was per-ceived by the children 
as a potentially need-fulfilling phenomenon and not 
merely as an escape from suffering and pain. These 
idiosyncratic ideations alone did not cause suicidal 
behavior, but were instrumental in the actualization 
of such behavior in the thr-ee children Cp. 676). 
They consider these distorted concepts not "a massive 
regression in ego functioning and a rupture in total ego 
integrity" because the children "did not indicate such a 
regression in ego functioning and behavior" Cp. 676). 
conclude that the distortions 
are a result of a defensive process. A chi 1 d who 
contemplates suicide must either accept the terror 
of the finality of death or accept 1 i fe with its 
anguish unless he is in a state of mind that 
facilitates self-destruction •••• Another hypothesis 
is that the distor-tions reflect a misinterpretation 
They 
of facts or indirect experience with death due to 
the immaturity of cognition in the early 
developmental stages (p. 676). 
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They comment that "Many children show a split in the death 
concept; they may have a mature concept of impersonal death, 
but a rather childish concept of their own personal death" 
(p. 677). 
Orbach and Glaubman <1978) hypothesized that 
an idiosyncratically distorted view of death held by 
children with pathology or under severe stress that 
elicits self-destructive behavior could 
facilitate suicidal behavior •••• (because) ••• the 
threat inherent in suicidal thinking engages 
defenses that result in the distortion of the 
meaning of death. The emotional pressure 
experienced by the young suicidal child could affect 
his rather fluid cognitive structure in the 
direction of wishful thinking Cpp. 850-851). 
They also suggested an alternative: "Idiosyncratically 
distorted beliefs about death held by suicidal or other 
children could reflect a misinterpretation of facts or 
indirect experiences with death due to the children's level 
of cognitive development" Cp. 851>. If the 1 atter 
hypothesis held, they predicted that different types of 
children would hold distorted views. 
They formed three · 9roups of thildren--suicidal, 
aggressive, and normal--to investigate these hypotheses. 
Asked what causes death, aggressive children gave 
significantly more responses with aggression and brutality, 
suicidal ones significantly more responses with suicide and 
self-destruction, and normal children named old age and 
illness. Regarding personal death, suicidal chi 1 dren 
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"attributed life qualities to the state of death 
significant 1 y more than aggressive or normal children 11 <p. 
854), but not for impersonal death. Suicidal children 
indicated significantly more than the others a belief of 
returning to life after a personal death. 
The authors infer 
that the child's concept of death is an integral 
part of his entire personality and reflects his life 
experience and internal dynamics. In this context, 
the idiosyncratically distorted death concept of the 
suicidal child can be interpreted best as a 
reflection of a defense process. Choosing suicide 
as a prospective solution for a tr-oubled 1 i fe is 
har111oni ous with the belief that death is another 
form of life or with the belief of returning to life 
after death. Apparently, the suicidal child 
protects himself against the threat of personal 
death by distortions and idiosyncracy (p. 855). 
Orbach and Glaubman C1979a) tested the contention 
that a distorted death concept at a very young age 
reflects a _defensive process against the 
overwhelming fear of death. Thus, the young child 
describes death as reversible and temporary in order 
to master the realization of death <p. 671). 
They compared three groups of children--suicidal, 
aggressive, normal--aged 10 to 12, on measures of abstract 
thought <Si mi 1 ar it i es subtest of the WISC>, the authors' 
construct -of life, and their construct of death. They found 
that 
suicidal children distorted the death concept more 
frequently than the other two groups, although they 
did not differ from those groups in other measures. 
Thus, the distortions in the death concept seem to 
be independent of general cognitive functioning. 
Apparently, the threat inherent in thinking about 
death affects the child's rather fluid cognitive 
structure in the direction of distortion and wishful 
thinking about death. Such a defensive perception 
may then seYve as a new motivating f·~rce for suicide 
(p. 673). 
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Orbach, Gross, and Glaubman <1981) interviewed 11 
suicidal children whose fantasies and perceptions 
demonstrated four common characteristics: 1. Death involves 
a continuation of life, but more satisfying; 2. Deprivation 
of needs predominate their feelings, especially relationship 
needs; 3. Two views of death may coexist, one as attractive 
and unrealistic, the other as yealistic accompanied by 
anxiety; 4. Personalities and mental states determine 
perceptions of death and fantasies. 
Orbach, Feshbach, Carlson, Glaubman, and Gross <1983) 
consider suicide in children as 
not merely a reaction to a specific problem but 
requires a particular state of mind and personality 
organization. Each of the conflicting forces can be 
described as a complex attitude composed of a 
cluster of cognitive conceptualizations, emotional 
states, and motivational tendencies concerning life 
and death (pp. 661-662). 
From their study comparing 58 normal and 52 suicidal 
latency-age children, they conclude that suicidal children's 
"misconception about death <i.e., death as another form of 
1 i fe) is a defensive maneuver to cope with the - an)(i ety - of 
planning suicide rather than a reflection of cognitive 
immaturity" <p. 66YJ. fhe attraction to death "attitude is 
unc;table and is most sensitive to changes in suicidal 
behavior and to changes in life circumstances~ Cp. 669>, and 
"along with the experience of strong repulsion by 1 i fe the 
suicidal child shows a considerable degree of attraction to 
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"life, which can be expressed in an obvious behavioral form" 
(p. 669). 
In a replication study <Orbach, Feshbach, Carlson, 8< 
Ellenberg, 1'984) which included terminally ill children 
between 6 and 12 <n=28), the authors tentatively conclude 
that suicidal children's "attraction to death is a defensive 
maneuver of coping with death, highly ~esponsive to changes 
in the child's state of mind and sense of well-being" Cp. 
1026). 
Suicidal and chronically i 11 children, in spite of 
their suffering, do not lose their attraction to 
life. Their feelings about life are highly 
conflictual, yet they are able to experience 
enjoyment and satisfaction (p. 1026). 
Pfeffer, Conte, Plutchik, and Jerrett (1980) found 13 
outpatient suicidal children significantly more preoccupied 
with death than 26 nonsuicidal children, but found no 
differences in their understanding of death. The suicidal 
children thought of death as "a means of eliminating stress 
and attaining peace" <p. 710). 
Carlson, Asarnow, and Orbach <1987) "assessed the 
understanding of death and knowledge of suicide" in 26 
normal school children ages 8 to 13, 28 inpatient children 
ages 8 to 10, 32 inpatient children ages 11 to 13, and 
inpatient young adolescents (p. 186). Among all subjects, 
757. comprehended the irreversibility of death, regardless of 
grade level, age, or sex; the percentage reached 100 among 
adolescents. Reasons given for suicide included having a 
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hard time, perceiving life as terrible, hating oneself, 
feeling depressed, angry, hopeless, angry, useless and, 
among 207. of the hospitalized children, feeling crazy. 
School children specifically mentioned types of separations 
such as parental neglect, divorce, breakup, or death. The 
majority of all subjects answered affirmatively when asked 
whether one attempting to commit suicide would want to be 
saved. 
Asked to name ways to commit suicide, younger children 
usually responded with shooting, stabbing, or don't know. 
Younger children's notions were less informed, e.g., "'bang 
my head against concrete until my brains fall out,' 11 "'choke 
myself with my hands'" <p. 189). The authors consider that 
age and cognitive ability does have a strong 
influence on imagining a lethal plan •••• Taken with 
the fact that children are much less likely to 
implement what they fantasize leads to two possible 
explanations. The first is that preadolescent 
children rarely totally comprehend self-
destruction. They simply apply what they know about 
violent death, probably from the media, where 
shooting and stabbings are rife, to themselves <p. 
191). 
The second explanation is that, although 
younger children know how to kill themselves, they 
are simply not invested in really doing so. In 
contrast with older children and adolescents, they 
cannot conceive of circumstances in which someone 
might commit suicide, and when they do their.reasons 
are often capricious. By adolescence, and possibly 
with the more abstract thinking that goes with it, 
the emotions of self-hate, despair, and anger are 
recognized as motivating forces behind self-
destruction. It would appear that the frequency and 
possibly the intensity of these feelings increases 
with age as wel 1. There may al so be a greater 
connection with experiencing these feelings and 
suicidal behavior. Finally, our data indicate that 
maturity brings more consistency between thought and 
action. The fact that adolescents think that 
o v e Y dos i n g w i 1 1 k i 11 th em, i d eat e i t , and t y y i t 
suggests a greater follow-through and commitment on 
their- par-t (p. 192). 
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Pfeffer (1985) conducted a study of 101 normal 
children ages 6 to 12 in a r-egular school setting. Twelve 
(11.91.) of the students expressed suicidal actions or ideas. 
Compared with the remainder of the sample, suicidal children 
expressed significantly more preoccupation with death, "more 
recent and past depression, mor-e suicidal thoughts among the 
mother-s, and a gr-eater- tendency to use introjection as 
an ego defense" (p. 79). The children worried about their 
families, knew their mothers were depressed, and had 
"definite concepts about death and conscious intentions to 
kill or severely injure themselves" <p. 80) and their 
ideation included highly lethal methods: stabbing, hanging, 
drowning, jumping from high places. 
Pfeffer's study (1985> reveals that suicidal childr-en 
speak openly and with clarity about death and their 
conscious intentions of self-destructive actions. They also 
<Pfeffer, 1981a) "have distinct concepts that death is 
reversible and that death provides a temporary state of 
pleasantness. unconsciously equated death with 
gratification of wishes from an all-giving and passive 
mother" (p. 116). 
For comparison, in a study of non-suicidal children, 
Kooc her ( 1973) used Piaget's framework of cognitive 
development (i.e., preoperational and concrete operational 
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subper-iods, for-mal oper-ational per-iod) in his study of 75 
children of at least normal intelligence aged six to fifteen 
to ascertain their thinking towards death. Eight children, 
al 1 preoper-ational (407. of the category>, considered death 
reversible; no childr-en in the other groups believed death 
reversible. Preoperational thinking persisted through age 
9-10 in boys <n=2> and 8-9 Cn=l> in girls although one girl, 
10-11, was rated preoperational. 
With younger children, Rosenthal et al. <1986) formed 
four groups based on suicidal fantasies and behaviors: The 
"self-punishment" group had suffered parental physical abuse 
"and came to regard themselves with the same hostility and 
criticism that others had expressed to them"; these 6 boys 
viewed death as irreversible Cp. 207>. The "reunion with a 
central nurturant figure" category, 1 boy, fantasied a wish 
to "rejoin a loved one" and viewed death as reversible Cp. 
208). The "escape and rectification of an unbearable life 
situation" category, 1 gir-1, expressed wish fulfillment 
"dictated by instinctual forces" Cp. 209). The "self-
puni shment and reunion" category (escape> results from a 
fantasy for rescue from an intolerable life situation in 
which the child can think of no alternative Cp. 210). 
Most children, including some pr-e-operational ones, 
comprehend the irreversibility of death. Considerations of 
suicide require a means to overcome the fear of 
annihilation; a belief in the reversibility of death 
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provides the means for some children, in spite of their 
comprehension of the irreversibility of impersonal death. 
Orbach et al. ( 1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1981, 1983, 1984) 
consider suicidal children's belief in the reversibility of 
death to constitute part of a defensive process which allows 
suicidal action to occur. The defensive process involves a 
cognitive distortion in the comprehension of the finality of 
personal death. Pfeffer's (1981a) study appears to support 
these conclusions, for the children believed that death 
would provide gratification. Pfef fer's (1985) study of 
schoolchildren suggests that those considered suicidal saw 
death as final. The Orbach studies particularly show that 
the defensive process which allows suicidal behavior to 
occur may alleviate the anxiety of planning and executing a 
suicide; yet, it seems that it constitutes the failure of 
defense mechanisms in that it fails to protect from suicidal 
behavior. 
Suicidal Fantasies 
Pfeffer <1986) defines suicidal fantasies "as special 
ideas that provide the reason for suicidal actions. These 
fantasies are consciously expressed ideas that have 
unconscious derivatives" <p. 162>. She identifies wish 
fulfillment and the diminution of painful states as 
fantasies which may impel suicidal action when they fail to 
bring about their intended purpose. Component motives 
<Pfeffer, 1986) of suicidal fantasies include the wish to 
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ki 11 and to dies a wish for rescue, to escape unbearable 
circu•stances, to achieve a pleasant state, to punish 
parents, to reunite with kind parents. 
Gould <1965) adds the motives of the wish to "gain 
support and strength through joining the powerful lost loved 
object,• to retaliate for abandonment or its threat, to 
manipulate in order "to obtain love and attention," to atone 
for sins, and to murder oneself Cp. 237>. 
In a survey of 652 children <including adolescents> 
and their •others, Velez and Cohen (1988> found greater 
frequency of suicidal ideation in children's reports than in 
the mothers' reports of their children. 
Reporting on the attempted suicide of a 7-year-old 
boy, Fried.an and Corn <1985> reveal tha boy's fantasies as 
his death would cause his parents to reunite, revenge 
against parents, and "the need to obtain control and repair 
his self-image by identification with Superman •••• 
Paradoxically, even as he wished to die, he wished to be an 
invulnerable superhero" Cp. 111). 
Santostefano, Rieder, and Berk C 1984>, on the 
assumption that "moventent in Rorschach imagery has long been 
viewed as indicating one's capacity to reflect and rehearse 
one's actions in thought" Cp. 4>, posed two hypotheses: 
that "fantasy mediates between impulses and actions by 
interpolating delay and serves as a way of rehearsing action 
in thought before these actions are performed in reality" 
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<p. 3) and that suicidal behavior represents "a form of 
maladaptive action" Cp. 4). They administered the Rorschach 
Test to 32 chi 1 dren between 8 and 16 hospitalized for 
suicidal behavior, to 91 children hospitalized for other 
psychiatric disorders, and to 44 school children. Suicidal 
children under 12 1/2 imagined more completed motion, acted 
as agents of motion rather than imagining agents, 
constructed fantasies of motion closely connected with 
reality, and imagined more vigorous motion. This finding 
suggests that suicidal children's fantasies are tentative, 
that they failed in their functions of gratification and 
discharge. 
Car- 1 son et al. ( 1987) compared suicidal children's 
concepts of which suicidal actions would prove fatal with 
those they fantasized for themselves and with the methods 
used in their attempts. Half of the children 
thought about killing themselves in ways that 
corresponded to their general knowledge about 
methods; 20.77. of children and 46.67. of adolescents 
made suicide attempts that corresponded with their 
knowledge •••• whereas only 20.7'1. of children 
implemented their fantasies and did what they 
ideated, 1007. of adolescents made attempts that 
corresponded to their fantasies <p = 0.03) Cp. 190). 
Pfeffer C1982a) compared three hospitalized suicidal 
children aged 6 to 12 diagnosed as neurotic, borderline, and 
psychotic to help determine 
whether fantasies or wishes that promote suicidal 
symptom formation are different in children with 
varying degrees of psychopathology 
•••• <and> ••• whether ego functioning that is 
associated with the expression of suicidal behavior 
differs in children with varying degrees of 
psychopathology Cp. 121>. 
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The neurotic child's fantasy "represented a wish to control 
the parents and get them to be more concerned about her 
needs and feelings," the borderline child's to "control her 
frustrating mother, to rectify the perceived family 
injustices, and to gain support from her parent," the 
psychotic child's to relieve and control intense confusional 
turmoil with the help of a powerful omnipotent parent" Cp. 
129). Pfeffer considers the suicidal fantasies similar and 
as expressions of "wishes of having powerful, all gratifying 
parents who could decrease frustration and withstand the 
children's aggressive and libidinal impulses" <p. 129). 
Chi 1 dren' s reliance on fantasy gratification to 
sustain themselves seems to include an inherent risk that 
the same reliance over time allows a shift in fantasy as 
protection to one as preparation for action. That is, if 
fantasy cannot provide relief its adaptive, defensive 
function fails to protect the child from self-destructive 




Cohen-Sandler, Berman, and King (1982> identified a 
suicidal grouping of 20 children in a study of 76 subjects 
ages 5 to 14 •• Fourteen of these children had received a 
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border 1 i ne personality diagnosis; 13 were depressed. The 
authors conceptualize the suicide attempts as "active coping 
efforts to counteract the sense of helplessness they felt in 
being unable to ef feet changes in the stressful, chaotic 
conditions of their families" Cp. 184). The active coping 
efforts took aggressive forms, half the suicidal group 
threatening people compared with 107. of depressed children 
and 117. of psychiatric cont~ols. Along with depressed 
affect, aggression constituted the significant symptom 
discriminating suicidal children. The authors consider 
"that both internalized and outwardly expressed rage may 
result from these children's continuous and increasing 
experience with loss and life stress" Cp. 185). 
Asarnow, Carlson, and Guthrie (1987) "evaluated the 
relations between depression, suicidal behavior, and 
children's strategies for coping with major life stresses" 
<p. 362) in psychiatric inpatients ages 8-13. No 
significant relations emerged between "degree of suicidal 
behavior and perceived competence measures," between 
hopelessness and suicidal behavior when controlling for 
depression, or between hopelessness and perceived competence 
when controlling for depression Cp. 364). 
Children with suicidal ideation showed less likelihood 
to generate active cognitive coping strategies. 
Hopelessness was associated with severity of depression and 
increased suicidal behavior. Depressed and nondepressed 
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children scored similarly on achievement and IQ tests; thus, 
"negative self-perceptions of depressed children represent 
negative biases rather than true differences in competence" 
<p. 364). "The quantity of adaptive coping strategies that 
children generated did not differentiate diagnostic 
groups of suicidal and nonsuicidal children" <p. 365>, but 
"nonsuicidal children generated more active cognitive coping 
strategies than suicidal children" <p. 365). The authors 
consider this finding as suggesting "that suicidal children 
may fail to spontaneously generate cognitive mediational 
strategies to regulate their affective and behavioral 
responses to stressful life events" (p. 365). 
Carlson and Cantwell <1982) 
hypothesized that children with more chronic 
problems would feel more desperate and have fewer 
coping skills • • • (but) it did not appear that 
duration of psychopathology as we defined it played 
a part in suicidal behavior (p. 365). 
Orbach et al. <1981) discovered that the "majority" of 
11 suicidal children interviewed 
revealed, alongside the problematic aspects of 
behavior, healthy personality characteristics and a 
strong wi 11 to stay alive. They tried to form 
interpersonal relationships, expressed their 
creativity, and showed a.ltruism a.s well a.s 
sensitivity to others <p. 186). 
The authors interpret their findings as 
representing a healthy and positive motivation to 
cling to life. In addition, contradictory to what 
has been stated by Ackerly <1967), suicidal behavior 
is not necessarily an expression of total regression 
and development or of a process of mental 
deterioration. This phenomenon explains the 
frequent surprise that people show when they are 
faced with suicidal behavior among young children. 
The positive and heal thy aspects of behavior can 
mask the inner turmoil and depression <pp. 186-187). 
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Suicidal children's difficulty devising adaptive 
coping strategies seems expected considering suicidal 
children's cognitive rigidity, the effects of depressive 
symptoms on cognitive functioning, hopelessness, and rage. 
Given their parental modeling, active coping strategies 
devised spontaneously by suicidal children appear rigid and 
few. Suicidal behavior thus constitutes a very risky and 
desperate attempt to effect change in their lives. 
Ego Defenses 
Pfeffer, Conte, Plutchik, and Jerrett (1979) 
identified 42 children as suicidal from an inpatient 
population of 58 children ages 6 to 12. To discriminate 
these children, they had devised "eight structured Child 
Suicide Potential Scales" from clinical experience and a 
literature review to identify "variables most likely to be 
relevant to suicidal behavior in children" <p. 681). The 
scales are Spectrum of Suicidal Behavior (a five-point 
scale>, Precipitating Events, Affects and Behavior--recent, 
Affects and Behavior--past, Family Background, Concept of 
Death, Ego Functioning, and Ego Defense Mechanisms. Each 
child's therapist, a child psychologist or child 
psychiatrist, administered the battery; the standard 
clinical evaluation included the WISC-R, Rorschach, Thematic 
Apperception Test, Bender-Gestalt test, and Human Figure 
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Drawings. After administering the battery, the therapist 
wrote a det ai 1 ed report. Thirty of the reports were 
selected at random and read by another clinician who stated 
an estimate of suicidal potential on the spectrum of 
suicidal behavior seal e without knowledge of the initial 
rating. Interrater reliability was+ .94 on this scale. 
Reliability coeffecients for the other scales included 
affects and behavior--past, +. 98 and recent, + .82; concept 
of death, + .86, family background, + .71; and precipitating 
events, + • 57. Ego functioning and ego defense scales have 
no reported reliability coeffecients. No validity 
coeffecients are stated for any of the scales. 
Defense profiles for both suicidal and nonsuicidal 
children were similar. Commonly used defenses included the 
following: denial ("avoiding awareness of some painful 
external reality •• (by) ••• withholding conscious 
understanding of the meaning and implications of what is 
perceived" [Horowitz, 1988, p. 1911>; projection; 
introjection; repression; and displacement <transferring 
avoided ideas and feelings "to some other person, situation, 
or object 11 CHorowi tz, 1988, p. 192]). Infrequently used 
defenses included intellectualization <avoiding "the 
emotional implications of a topic by dealing with it on a 
purely ideational level" [Horowitz, 1988, p. 193l); undoing; 
and reaction formation. 
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Suicidal children showed more preoccupation with 
death; preoccupation correlated with degree of 
dangerousness. They worried about family members dying; 
they showed more distress at the death of important persons; 
they conceived of death as temporary. Those who considered 
death pleasant showed more dangerousness. 
Pfeffer, Conte, Plutchik, and Jerrett <1980) applied 
the same (1979) battery of suicide potential scales to an 
outpatient population of 39 children ages 6 to 12 years. 
They found no differences in defense profiles between 
suicidal and nonsuicidal children: 
The most frequent defense mechanisms utilized were 
denial, projection, introjection, and repression. 
When intensely stressed by intrapsychic and external 
pressures, the defenses were not adequate to prevent 
symptom development, including acting out of 
suicidal impulses. Undoing, reaction formation, and 
intellectualization were the least frequent defense 
mechanisms Cp. 708). 
Specific risk factors include the "wish to die, intense 
preoccupations with death, and suicidal behavior in the 
parents" (p. 708). 
The suicide potential scales were employed in a study 
of 102 inpatients ages 6 to 12 years <Pfeffer, Plutchik, and 
Mizruchi, 1983). Each interview of children and parents was 
observed by "two experienced interviewers simultaneously" 
who independently completed the scales (p. 154). Inter rater 
agreement on all the scales was high, 92X to 100X, and 
internal reliabilities were significant. 
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Pfeffer et al. 1 ab el ed 17 of the subjects non-
assaul ti ve-nonsui c i dal, · 26 assaultive only, 11 suicidal 
only, and 48 assaultive-suicidal. Psychiatric diagnoses 
assessed 5 of the suicidal-only group with affective 
d i so r de r , 1 2 ass au 1 t i v e - on 1 y c h i 1 d r en w i t h spec i f i c 
developmental disorder, and 26 assaultive-suicidal children 
with borderline personality disorder. On measures of ego 
defenses, two measured significantly different: The non-
ass au l ti ve-n on suicidal group scored higher on 
intellectualization, the assaultive-suicidal group highest 
on compensation <unconscious attempt "to offset, to make up 
for," actual or imagined deficiencies [Laughlin, 1983, p. 
18]). A nonsigni ficant finding showed the suicidal-only 
group highest on reality testing. The researchers concluded 
that the suicidal-only children have "relatively stable ego 
functioning, including good reality testing, who 
deco•pensate and become overtly depressed only under the 
influence of extreme environmental stressors" <p. 156). 
Assaultive-suicidal children "have distinct ego deficits and 
are prone to identify with parental acting-out of suicidal 
tendencies" Cp. 156>. 
Pfeffer, Zuckerman, Pl utchi k, and Mi z ruchi < 1984) 
compared 101 normal school children "selected by stratified 
random sampling from a computerized roster •••• to match the 
comparable age, sex, and racial/ethnic distributions" of 65 
child psychiatric inpatients in a voluntary unit <p. 417). 
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The suicide potential scales were administered to the 
subjects. Two clinicians observed 22 of the interviews and 
independently completed the scales and made DSM-III 
diagnoses. Interjudge reliability coeffecients for Ego 
Defense Scales include intellectualization r = .96, 
regression r = .87, undoing r = .85, reaction formation r = 
• 82, compensaion r = • 74, denial r = • 72, repression r = 
.72, projection r = .69, introjection r = .57, sublimation r 
= .57, and displacement r = .52. 
Twelve percent of the school children had suicidal 
ideas, threats, or attempts compared with 79X of the 
inpatients. The 12 school children who manifested suicidal 
behavior, compaYed with the other school children, scored 
significantly higher on the variables of pYeoccupation with 
death, recent depression, Bender-Gestalt score, recent and 
past signs of general psychopathology, tendency of the 
mother to have suicidal thoughts, and the use of 
introjection as a defense. "Estimates of IQ, reading, 
spelling, and arithmetic achievement, degree of reality 
testing and impulse control weYe not significantly different 
for the suicidal and nonsuicidal school children" Cp. 420). 
They comment: 
Compared with inpatients, the school children had 
higher mean scores • • • on such variables as death 
preoccupations, sublimation as a defense mechanism, 
parental reports of depYession, and alcoholism. The 
school children had lower mean scores • • • on such 
variables as recent and past aggression, recent and 
past antisocial behavior, recent depression, total 
ego defenses, and parental separation Cp. 421). 
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Suicidal children in both populations scored higher than 
nonsuicidal children in both populations on depression, 
preoccupation with death, parental suicidal behavior, and 
introjection as a defense mechanism. 
The school children <Pfeffer, 1985) adapted to 
parental depression by identifying with the depressed 
parent, withdrawing from social activities, and inhibiting 
their expression of aggression because they feared a parent 
may die. There existed no significant relationship between 
the presence of any psychiatric diagnosis and suicidal 
behavior, a finding considered tentative because of the 
small number of suicidal children. 
Pfeffer, Plutchik, Mizruchi, and Lipkins (1986) used 
the same research instruments and similar methodology as 
cited above in a comparative study of 106 inpatients aged 6 
to 12 years with 101 outpatients and 101 nonpatient school 
children. They found the defense of introjection a risk 
factor with inpatients and suicidal nonpatients. Factors 
associated with suicidal behavior in all three groups were 
recent general psychopathology, preoccupation with death, 
recent and past depression. 
A follow-up study took place two years later <Pfeffer, 
Lipkins, Plutchik, & Mizruchi, 1988> with 75 of the original 
nonpat i ent <schoolchildren) subjects, 67 of whom answered 
questions about suicidal thoughts or behavior; 8 children 
refused to answer questions about suicide. Showing evidence 
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of suicid~l thoughts or acts placed subjects in the suicidal 
category. Using DSM-III criteria, evaluators diagnosed 57X 
of the students with 9 Axis I and 3 Axis II diagnoses. No 
significant relationship existed between "a particular 
follow-up diagnosis and suicidal behavior," a finding 
similar to that in the initial study (p. 36). Grouped 
according to the existence of any type of psychiatric 
diagnosis "at the time of follow-up ••• significantly more 
suicidal children had a current DSM-III diagnosis than the 
nonsuicidal children" Cp. 36). 
Suicidal children scored significantly higher than 
nonsuicidal ones on variables of depression, death 
preoccupations, aggression, general psychopathology, and the 
ego defenses of denial, reaction formation, and projection. 
No significant differences existed on variables of 
achievement in reading, spelling, arithmetic; impulse 
control, hopelessness; reality testing; assaultive behavior; 
Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist scores Call within normal 
ranges>; ordinal position in the family; parental 
separation; birth weight or complications; or history of 
parental physical illness or psychiatric disorders. A third 
of all the children interviewed experienced parents' 
separation or divorce; "7. 47. had at least one parent with 
symptoms of depression, 4. 77. had at least one pal"ent who 
abused alcohol and/or drugs, 6.77. had other relatives who 
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attempted suicide, and 8.0X had relatives who committed 
suicide" (p. 38). 
About 85X of the children had no suicidal tendencies 
at the initial evaluation or at the two-year follow-up. 
"Fifty percent of the children who initially reported 
suicidal tendencies also reported them at fol low-up. In 
addition, 15.37. of the children reported suicidal tendencies 
at follow-up but not at the initial assessment" <p. 38). 
What distinguished this group with statistical significance 
were four variables: assaultive behavior, general 
psychopathology, depression, and death preoccupations. The 
number of suicidal children at the initial study and at 
follow-up, and who were suicidal ini·tially but not at 
follow-up were too few (4) to derive statistical 
comparisons. 
About 18X (13) of the children reported ideation and 
1.5X reported threats, but no one had actually made a 
suicide attempt. Among those who reported ideation or 
threats, "most <6'9. 2'X.> were vague about having a plan for 
suicidal action," mentioning shooting, wrist cutting, 
stabbing, and jumping (p. 36). Of the 149 parents 
interviewed, 107. "expressed suicidal ideas and/or acts, 11 but 
no significant relationship existed between the children's 
or mothers' suicidal tendencies (p. 36>. 
The authors comment that their findings "suggest that 
at a given time, a prevalence of suicidal ideas for normal 
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preadolescents of between 8.'9'1. and 17.'9'1. can be expected" 
<p. 3'9), and that 
it appears that suicidal ideas may be approximately 
10 times more prevalent than suicidal acts among 
these preadolescents, and that many factors must 
operate in order to influence a child to move from 
having a suicidal idea to carrying out a su1cuJal 
act. These risk factoys are depression, death 
preoccupations, and general psychopathology <p. 40). 
·Carlson et al. <1'987) identified 15.4'1. of normal 
school children as having suicidal thoughts even though 
their study design attempted to exclude school children who 
had ever received psychological services; all of these 
children were over age 11. 
Pfeffer C1'982a) concludes that 
borderline and psychotic children have 
characteristic defects in ego functioning which make 
these children more vulnerable to the onslaught of 
external and internal stresses. The lack of a 
complexly ordered hierarchy of ego defenses in 
border I ine and psychotic children may account for 
the astounding incidence of such acting out 
behaviors as suicidal tendencies noted in these 
children (p. 133). 
Paulson, Stone, and Sposto <1'978) identified 
internalized hate and anger, conscious and/or 
unconscious death wishes, masochistic, self-
destructive acts of violence ••• so intertwined with 
feelings of gui 1 t and blame, that atonement and 
relief were possible only by escape in~o a suici~al 
state of separation from faf8i ly relationships Cp. 
237). 
In their literature review, Joffe and Offord C1Yt:S3) 
f•:>und that 
the precipitating stress preceding suicidal 
behaviour is only the final factor in a history of 
long-standing difficulties and progressive emotional 
decompensation; there appears <sic) to be few, if 
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any , i so 1 at ed , i mp u 1 s i v e su i c i d a 1 a c t s i n we 11 -
adjusted children (p. 60). 
Although this section emphasized ego defensive 
functioning, a number of r-isk variables r-eoccurr-ed 
throughout the studies: pr-eoccupation with death (1979, 
1980, 1984, 1986, 1988), parental suicidal behavior <1980, 
1984), recent and past depression ( 1984, 1986), and past 
signs of psychopathology <1984, 1986, 1988). Grouped with 
the variables depressed affect and threatening people 
<Cohen-Sandler et al., 1982>, the cluster seems a valid and 
reliable measure of risk. 
A component of Pfeffer's investigations constitute 
attempts to isolate discrete ego defenses and their 
operation in suicidal children. Pr-oblems attend these 
efforts. They include defining the defenses as operational 
constructs which can be observed and measured. None of the 
reports states how this was accomplished except for 
references to the source of the definitions of defenses 
employed <e.g., Freud, 1966). Pfeffer's book <1986) lists 
the defenses of the ego defense scale in terms of observable 
behavior, but no article contains the lists. 
Whether the operation of defenses can discriminate 
among suicidal and non-suicidal children regardless of 
patient status seems essential to questions of their utility 
as estimators of risk. Pfeffer et al's. six studies address 
this question. The study (1979) of inpatient children found 
no differences in defense profiles between suicidal and non-
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suicidal children. The study <1980) of outpatient children 
also showed no differences. The study (1983) of 102 
inpatients identified two significant differences, the non-
assaultive, nonsuicidal group highest on 
intellectualization, the assaultive-suicidal group highest 
on compensation. 
The study (1984) of schoolchildren and inpatients 
identified introjection as the one defense distinguishing 
suicidal from nonsuicidal children regardless of patient 
status. A comparison (1986) of schoolchildren with 
inpatients and outpatients identified introjection 
discriminating suicidal inpatients and schoolchildren. The 
follow-up study (1988) of schoolchildren identified 
suicidals with significantly higher scores on denial, 
reaction formation, and projection. 
Overall, the significant occurrence of primitive 
defenses--introjection, projection, denial, compensation, 
displacement--was twelve times for suicidal children; 
significance for advanced defenses--repression, reaction 
formation--was three times for suicidal children regardless 
of status. These mixed results show that raters can 
identify the operation of ego defenses in clinical 
interviews, but the utility of doing so seems only 
supplemental to other information sought. 
Another concern involves the use of ego defenses as 
spec i fie risk factors in assessing suicide potential. As 
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Cohen-Sandler et al. ( 1982) state, "Symptomatology, in 
general, seems less useful than do stress and life history 
data for discriminating the suicidal child" (p. 185). One 
can readily observe assaultive behavior, compile reports of 
threats, observe depressed affect, and record accounts of 
family violence and parental suicidal behavior. An 
assessment of ego defensive functioning would occur in time 
only subsequent 
with the report 
to the reports of these variables, along 
of the manifest suicidal behavior. It 
appears, then, that the utility of a consider-ation of 
defenses is as information to consider in estimating a 
child's capacity for self-protection under stress. Thus, 
including an assessment of ego defenses in an assessment of 
a suicidal or potentially suicidal child may assist the 
clinician in devising an intervention strategy. 
For example, a chi Id manifesting suicidal ideation 
along with a relatively mild depressive reaction to parents' 
separation or divorce, and who has good reality testing, 
op er at i ve r epr essi on, and discharges drives through 
sublimation and fantasy may require a relatively simple 
intervention. A seriously depressed child who threatens or 
attempts suicide, threatens or attacks others, ruminates 
about death, observes parental violence or suicidal behavior 
or receives parental abuse may require an intensive, 
comprehensive intervention. 
89 
The results of Pfeffer et al.'s investigations suggest 
that an organization of defenses depends on the type of 
suicidal child identified, that is, from the higher 
functioning suicidal-only child to the disorganized 
functioning of the psychotic child with distortions in ego 
development. Similarities among defenses occurred for 
inpatient and suicidal children in that developmentally the 
defenses occur relatively early in the separation-
individuation process and are thus less adaptive for latency 
age children. Although classifying the defenses of denial, 
introjection, and projection as relatively primitive, these 
defenses, along with repression, constitute many of the ones 
utilized by normal children as part of the structure of 
latency. Per-haps what separates suicidal and psychiatric 
chi 1 dren from normal ones is an over-reliance on more 
primitive defenses, particulaYly when experiencing stressful 
circumstances, which prevents or delays the acquisition of 
more appropr-iate and adaptive defenses for their age. 
Relatively normal children have acquired more advanced 
defenses, and thus have a greater range of total defenses, 
including those which facilitate active coping efforts, 
e.g., intellectualization and sublimation. Considering the 
f am i 1 y systems of suicidal chi 1 dr en, their acquiring more 
adaptive defenses seems highly improbable and would in 
effect create children more adequately developed than some 
of their own parents. 
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Introjection, the one defense appearing consistently 
in profiles of suicidal children, may illustrate these 
children's incapacity to internalize loving and nurturing 
aspects of their parents over hostile ones because of the 
preponderance of hostility and conflict in their 
interpersonal relationships. As a less mature mechanism 
than identification, introjection does not afford 
opportunities for taking in selected, preferred aspects of 
their parents; hostile aggression thus predominates. It 
also predominates because of the daily necessity of adapting 
to the family environment. 
Conversely, the relative lack of reliance on more 
advanced ego defenses restricts the child's emotional 
functioning and limits the self-protective capacity. 
Lacking the defense of sublimation, for example, the child 
cannot rechannel hostile aggression into constructive 
activities which would dissipate the hostility. Similarly, 
without reaction formation the child cannot develop 
attitudes in opposition to those of parents. Without the 
self-forgiving function of undoing, the child cannot reduce 
the impact of the experience of guilt. 
Reliance on maladaptive ego defenses constitutes a 
deficit; hostility and rage as the dominant affects 
illustrate deviant object representations through expression 
in aggressive actions; hopelessness as the lack of future 
expectation ("powered" by various motivations> constitutes 
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the cognitive expression of depression; suicidal fantasies 
as the expression of the child's attempt to provide self 
care and succor also permit suicidal planning in reality. 
Life stresses--chaotic families--interfere with the child's 
attempts to internalize nurturing object-representations 
subsequent to the critical developmental periods. 
The child is left deficient. Hostility and rage 
dominate as reactions to obJect losses and defense to a 
proclivity to depression; reliance on primitive ego defenses 
interferes with the acquisition of age-appropriate ones; the 
structure of latency is mutable; fantasy fails in its 
function of self-esteem protection through gratification and 
drive discharge and transforms into fantasies of 
annihilation; failure of fantasy signals the failure of 
defenses, and suicidal action follows. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR 
This thesis proposes that suicidal behavior in latency 
age children results from the failure of their protective 
psychological mechanisms during periods of intense stress. 
It further proposes that the failure occurs because suicidal 
children's ego organizations include disturbances which make 
them susceptible to self-destructive behavior. That is, 
suicidal behavior is a possible outcome of a process of 
disturbed development. Further, this thesis assumes that 
developmental object relations theory can explain the 
developmental precursors of suicidal behavior. 
Object relations theory emphasizes the development of 
a chi Id's ego organization and its functioning during the 
first three years of life based on the principle of 
orthogenesis. During this period of development, ego 
development may proceed normally, in which case the child at 
thirty-six months or so has established the basis for 
normality in 
Alternatively, 
subsequent periods of development. 
modifications of the developing ego 
organization may occur as deviations or distortions in 
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development; these include the predisposition to 
disturbances in later periods of development. 
The application of object relations theory to the 
phenomenon of suicidal behavior in latency age children 
includes certain assumptions and limitations. One 
assumption holds that the theory's concepts comprise 
developmental reality and elucidate it. 
Another is that successful completion of the tasks of 
the first three years can account for the establishment of a 
normal structure of latency. This position disregards the 
years four through five in which other developmental tasks 
<e.g., identification with the same sex parent; acquisition 
of the defenses of regression, intellectualization, and 
repression; socialization> require negotiation. A 
consequence of this is the neglect of the effects of 
developmental disturbances during these years and the 
ramifications of them for the establishment of the structure 
of latency and the capacity to exercise self-protective 
mechanisMs. 
The assumption that suicidal behavior in latency age 
children originates exclusively from disturbances during the 
first three years of life hence seems unwarranted. 
Developmental tasks, loss, and excessive stress occur 
throughout development as illustrated by Pfeffer's <1982a> 
report of suicidal behavior in a child considered neurotic. 
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The approach also ignores the effects of inordinate 
stress encountered by a normal chi Id with an established 
structure of latency. Studies of suicidal behavior in 
normal children <Pfeffer et al., 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988> 
identify a percentage with suicidal ideation and death 
preoccupations. To infer from these findings that these 
children's ego organizations are necessarily disturbed would 
be fallacious. Disturbances could be suspected and 
investigated, but not concluded. 
Object relations theory may explain the manifestation 
of suicidal behavior in some latency age children, those 
with disturbances in ego organization occurring in the first 
three years of life. It seems unable to account for the 
phenomenon in all suicidal children and thus lacks the rigor 
of a unified theory of suicidal behavior in this population. 
Three cautions accompany the explication which 
follows. The first is that it applies only to children 
considered to have experienced disturbances in ego 
organization during the first three years of life. The 
second is that evidence derives from studies -whose research 
instruments are in the process of validation. 
that it is tentative and speculative. 
The third is 
The model of suicidal behavior in latency age children 
<Figure 2> depicts the developmental sequence of children 
who may engage in suicidal behavior. For these children, 
experiences of loss and/or extreme environmental stress--
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chaotic, violence prone families, suicidal parents--disturb 
their developing ego organizations <Bowlby, 1980, Nagera, 
1981, Toolan, 1981, Wolfenstein, 1969>. 
Separation-
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In the phase of normal symbiosis, loss means the loss 
of union which can occur through lack of maternal response 
<Hamilton, 1988> or through premature differentiation of 
separation served by aggression <Blanck ~ Blanck, 1979>. 
"Bad" experiences then predominate over "good• ones; a 
predisposition to aggression and depression results. 
Disturbances in the differentiation and practicing 
phases disrupt the creation of a supportive bond with the 
•other which interferes with the infant's separation. 
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Excessive anxiety and a depressive predisposition result 
<Mahler, 1986). 
Disturbances in the rapprochement phase interfere with 
the integration of good and bad self- and object-images into 
a stable sense of a self. Effects include a predisposition 
to low self-esteem and depressive affect <Blanck & Blanck, 
1974> and difficulty limiting aggression <Fraiberg, 1987>. 
Object constancy consolidates the rapprochement tasks. 
Disturbances include difficulty comforting oneself <Pine, 
1985), perceiving oneself and others as all-good or all-bad 
<i.e., splitting>, difficulty limiting anger, and depression 
from feeling a loss of love <Hamilton, 1988, Pine, 1985). 
These children have internalized primarily negative, 
hostile object representations and, consequently, developed 
primarily negative self- and object-images <Blanck & Blanck, 
1979, 1986, Hami 1 ton, 1988, Horowitz, 1988>. They rely 
excessively upon primitive psychological mechanisms for 
self-protection, for the provision of feelings of safety, 
and for the regulation of self-esteem and self-limiting 
behavior CChessick, 1985, Hamilton, 1988, Sarnoff, 1987>. 
The effects include a proclivity to depression through the 
inability to nurture the self adequately because the self-
image is underdeveloped, self-concept is variable, and self-
estee• is low <Blanck & Blanck, 1974, 1986>. 
In latency-age children the structure of latency 
provides a period of more or less stable functioning, at 
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least so long as the child's psychological mechanisms and 
environmental support foster the maintenance of the 
structure of latency <Sarnoff, 1987>. Where separation-
i ndi vi duat ion disturbances occurred, though, t .he latency 
organization is impaired to varying degrees. 
One impairment is the instability of defense 
mechanisms relied upon by the child to protect the self from 
external threats <i.e., environmental stressors> and to 
limit the expression of hostility. This means that the more 
developed mechanisms such as repression, sublimation, 
intellectualization, doing and undoing, and reaction 
formation are less consistently available for self-
protection than are the more primitive mechanisms of denial 
in fantasy, introjection, projection, and splitting. Thus, 
once adaptive mechanisms of the separation-individuation 
process no longer function adaptively, but maladaptively 
<Pfeffer et al., 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1988). 
Another impairment consists of the ego organization's 
inabi 1 i ty to sustain nurturing, self-comforting self- . and 
object-representations to protect and sustain the sense of 
self and self-esteem. That is, during the phases of the 
separation-individuation process, experiences of loss upset 
the differentiating and integrating process of the 
organizing ego, with a consequent modification of 
organization. This may have occurred through a frustrating 
relationship with caretakers, or with the loss of the 
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nurturing parent in reality. The result is a deficit in the 
child's ability to meet the task of taking in primarily 
positive object representations. The child internalizes 
primarily hostile and negative object-images through 
projective identification in an attempt to modify 
disappointing situations in reality. The ef feet is a 
deleterious one because of the attendant predominance of 
hostility and anger over love and nurture. The succeeding 
disturbances in ego organization predispose the child to 
suicidal behavior, particularly if the child lives in a 
chao-t i c f ami 1 y environment, one with parents who are 
violent, abusive, and/or suicidal. 
The child lacks the ability to effect change in the 
environment constructively, and may express frustration and 
rage toward others. Threatening and assaulting others 
<Cohen-Sandler et al., 1982, Garfinkel et al., 1982, Pfeffer 
et al. 1983, 1986, 1988> may constitute the behavioral 
expression of their frustration and rage in a sequence of 
projection and actualization <Sarnoff, 1987>. 
A severe depressive reaction may constitute another 
for• of the expression of frustration and rage, perhaps the 
suicidal only group of children identified by Pfeffer et al. 
(1983). 
The structure of latency loses its protectiveness 
because of reality demands <overwhelming stress> and the 
child's ego organization's inability to use fantasy to 
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obliterate external stresses and maintain itself. Because 
of the inability to deal constructively with reality 
demands, the child continues to rely on fantasy as defense. 
Defense through fantasy may protect the child, but may 
actually increases the child's susceptibility by transmuting 
into suicidal fantasies <Friedman IE Corn, 1'985, Pfeffer, 
1'982a, 1'985, 1'986>. Suicidal fantasies may provide a 
measure of surcease, but have no effect on reality, and 
transform into death preoccupations and suicidal ideation 
which presage and allow for as well as constitute suicidal 
planning. 
Coinciding with suicidal fantasies is the child's 
defensive belief that death is reversible, a belief contrary 
to the child's comprehension of impersonal death COrbach et 
a 1 • , 1 981 , 1 983, 1 984) • 
Fantasy loses its protective function and transforms 
into fantasies of escape from an intolerable situation, from 
pain, or reunion with an all-loving caretaker through death-
-the motivations for suicide. Fantasies for protection 
become fantasies of self-destruction which, in turn, become 
plans for suicidal acts. 
The final defense, splitting <Horowitz, 1'988, Pine, 
1'985>, allows the child to "totally split off good and bad 
sensations" <Pfeffer, 1'982a. p. 132>. The failure of the 
mechanism to provide relief removes the final defense 
against self-destruction, and suicidal behavior ensues. 
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Acting on a suicidal plan, the observable suicidal behavior 
occurs as a desperate, final step to alleviate suffering. 
It provides the means whereby the child's ego separates its 
self-images into all-bad, all-good ones, and becomes a way 
to preserve the all-good ones while abolishing from 
consciousness the all-bad ones. 
they 
The protective controls no 
have failed to protect longer operate because 
sufficiently to prevent 
behavior follows. 
a suicidal crisis. Suicidal 
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